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Communities and Crime

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At the end of the twentieth century the revival in state policies regarding the concept of 'community' is remarkable. Since the 1960s we have seen a growing trend towards the individualisation of culture, fragmentation of morals and the globalisation of political economies. As early as the 1930s the German sociologist Tönnis described and predicted the development of societies from a Gemeinschaft to a Gesellschaft. During the 1970s 'the community' was synonymous with a sort of old-fashioned common-sense way of looking at social life. More recently, western societies have shown a new interest, however, in communities as viable entities, which are not only important for people but also provide a focal point towards which politicians can direct their actions.

In the case of criminal justice and social policy there seems to be an extra reason for this orientation towards the community. The levels of safety and crime in different neighbourhoods vary considerably, and a high level of either safety or crime greatly influences the quality of life experienced. And there is massive evidence that there is a strong correlation between crime and other indicators as regards the quality of a neighbourhood. As far as the work of the Chicago-school in the first decades of the century is concerned, the science of criminology has always had a strong interest in community life and development of neighbourhoods. In this issue the relation between communities and crime is described from different perspectives.

The first article concerns the rate of violent crime which varies dramatically between different cities. Within cities, there exist enormous differences in violent crime between neighbourhoods. The potential value of comparative studies lies in the possibility of assessing the relative importance of different layers of social processes (e.g. individual, parochial, urban, national) for understanding violence. In addition the determinants of the ecology of violent crime can be compared. Manuel Eisner and Per-Olof Wikström report some preliminary findings on a comparative study of police recorded violent crimes in Stockholm and Basel. Both cities share important economic and social characteristics such as a high average level of income, a high percentage of workplaces in the service sector, a considerable immigrant population and a large surrounding metropolitan area. Yet there are also important differences, for example, violent crime seems to be more highly concentrated during weekend nights in Stockholm than in Basel and the presence of weapons in a community increases the risk of more serious outcomes of violent events. Offenders in both cities are highly concentrated in socially disorganised communities with few economic and social resources.
How can communities implement comprehensive prevention strategies whose components complement each other and achieve synergistic effects? J. David Hawkins presents in his article the concept of Communities That Care (CTC). The framework used is the social development model (SDM). Consistent with recent research, the SDM hypothesises that strong bonds to school, family and community serve as protective factors against behaviour that violates socially accepted behavioural standards. CTC guides communities, helping them to organise and operate effectively in order to promote positive social development in young people and prevent youth crime. CTC allows those who use it to select preventive policies, actions and programmes that best address the unique risk and protection profile of their community. The CTC strategy for community prevention has been implemented in over 500 communities across the United States in the past decade. In the United Kingdom, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation has provided funding to establish CTC-UK. In the Netherlands the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sport are collaborating to provide funding to translate and adapt CTC for the Netherlands and to install and test CTC in four pilot communities.

Per-Olof Wikström and Marie Torstensson give a summary of the work they carried out for the Swedish Government. The purpose of the study was to identify the ‘best’ organisation and direction for developing local crime prevention and its national support. Although the problems dealt with and the suggestions put forward in this article are primarily based on Swedish conditions and experiences, they do believe that it has a more general application. It is all too evident for even the most casual observer of the international literature on crime prevention that the problems and prospects facing crime prevention share many universal characteristics. The ‘ideal’ crime-prevention programme should encompass: early social prevention, later-stage social prevention, early situational prevention, general situational prevention, and programmes for chronic criminals. The authors clarify each of these premises.

Bram Peper and Frans Spierings discuss recent experiments with community mediation in the Netherlands. Community mediation is a form of mediation especially designed for neighbours (and other community members) to resolve their mutual conflicts outside the legal system and inside the local community. Conflicts between neighbours often involve ongoing struggles stretching over a long period. They typically begin with a life style difference, often merge with class and/or race differences, and escalate over time through a series of acts of annoyance and mutual retaliation. In the early 1970s, the founding of the San Francisco Community Boards (SFCB) shaped the idea of community mediation. In 1996–1997
three experimental projects were initiated in the Netherlands, aimed at conflict mediation at the local community level (in Rotterdam, Zwolle and Gouda). Over the last two years two models have developed: a neighbourhood model, and a city model. The article presents some findings of an evaluation study on the projects.

Advocates of the `community' concept assume that there is a relationship between a lack of `community' and the existence of high levels of crime. These issues are discussed in Adam Crawford’s article. Disorganised communities are associated with high levels of crime and, inversely, low crime areas are associated with well-organised and cohesive communities. Yet, ‘community’ is not synonymous with social order. There is much criminological evidence to suggest that ‘organised communities’ can be crimogenic, such as criminal gangs, football hooligans and deviant subcultures. In the quest for a more socially just public sphere, community safety and restorative justice have a significant, yet limited, contribution to make. In so doing, we need to be aware of both the dangers and virtues of ‘community’. In many senses, the article is a plea for a more subtle understanding of the limitations of communities, both in community safety and restorative justice, and of the ways in which appeals to community often misunderstand community dynamics, as well as the ways in which these connect with wider socio-economic changes and political discourses.

Martin Killias and Jacob Elfinus Sahetapy discuss the concept of `community' from a different angle. People may feel restrained not by neighbours, but by the consequences of their deeds on persons they are expected to include in their reasoning.

In the Current Issues section Martin Killias and Jacob Elfinus Sahetapy discuss the concept of ‘community’ from a different angle. The concept of community might need to be reorganised around the idea of solidarity with people for whom we feel responsible, rather than those living in close proximity to each other, or having frequent physical contacts. Frank Neubacher and colleagues compare crime data from four different cities over the period 1991–1997 and analyse the processing and selection procedures of the various justice systems.

J.C.J.B.

Forthcoming issues:

– Crime Trends in Europe
– Football Violence/Hooliganism
– Sexual Delinquency
– Migration and Crime
ABSTRACT. In this article the authors present some preliminary findings from a comparative study of police recorded violent crimes in Stockholm and Basel. They present the first results from a comparative analysis of the situational context, the ecology of crime, and of offender residences in these cities. There is impressive evidence of basic similarities in the situational context of violent crime and the residential distribution of violent offenders. Yet there are also significant differences, some of which may have interesting implications for crime prevention. Firstly, violent crime seems to be more highly concentrated during weekend nights in Stockholm than in Basel. Secondly, they find evidence that the presence of weapons in a community increases the risk of more serious outcomes of violent events. Efforts to reduce the availability of weapons may thus have significant effects on the outcomes of violence, but not necessarily on its frequency. Thirdly, they show that offenders in both cities are highly concentrated in socially disorganised communities with few economic and social resources.

KEYWORDS: comparative research, crime statistics, neighbourhood, statistical analysis, violent crime, weapons

The rate of violent crime varies dramatically between different cities. Within cities, there exist enormous differences in violent crime between neighbourhoods. Many criminological studies have investigated either determinants of between city variation or between neighbourhood variation. Yet there exist relatively few studies that analyse between, as well as within, city variation of urban crime simultaneously. The potential value of these type of comparative studies lies in the possibility of, firstly, assessing the relative importance of different layers of social processes (e.g. individual, parochial, urban, national) for understanding violence and, secondly, comparing the determinants of the ecology of violent crime between cities.

In this article we present some preliminary findings from a comparative study of police recorded violent crimes in Stockholm and Basel. Both cities share important economic and social characteristics such as a high average level of income, a high percentage of workplaces in the service sector, a considerable immigrant population and a large surrounding metropolitan area. Yet there are also important differences. Most notably, Stockholm is the capital of Sweden and a much larger city (circa 650,000 inhabitants) than Basel (circa 195,000 inhabitants). We will focus in this article on a comparison of, firstly, the contextual and situational structure of violent crimes and, secondly, the ecological variation of offender rates in both cities.
The Data

The data for the comparison between Stockholm and Basel were collected by special surveys of police files in the two cities (for detailed descriptions see Eisner 1997, p. 285; Wikström 1985; Wikström 1991, p. 260). The base year of the coding was 1982 in the Stockholm study and 1991 in the Basel survey. For most variables used in the Basel study, the categories developed by Wikström (1991) for the Stockholm study were adopted and, if necessary, slightly modified. Data were collected on victim and offender characteristics (e.g. age, sex, occupation), the social context of the crime (e.g. time, place, personal relationship), and ecological variables (e.g. geographic co-ordinates of victim and offender residence). McClintock and Wikström (1992) did a third study using the same methodology on Edinburgh. This city is not included in the present study, however.

In both cities, the proportion of coded police files (in relation to one-year numbers) differs between categories of violent crime (see Table I). Serious types of criminal violence (homicide, attempted homicide, and rape) are thus over-represented in the studied samples. In Basel, for example, cases of homicide (including attempts) were included over 9 years (1983–91) and cases of rape over 5 years (1987–91). The total number of criminal records studied is 957 in Basel as compared to 1876 in Stockholm.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number coded</th>
<th>Weighted number</th>
<th>Percentage of all crimes reported studied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serious assault</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel*</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>900 (9 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Petty assault</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>1093</td>
<td>4877</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Robbery</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>1141</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel*</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rape</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>200 (2 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>500 (5 years)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Attempted and completed homicide only.

bAll cases with known offender, 50% of cases with unknown offender.
Comparing the Rate of Violent Crime

Before we present the results from these studies we will briefly address the issue of violent crime rates in the two cities. There is a tradition in criminology of comparing Swiss and Swedish cities. Thus Marshall B. Clinard assumed in his well-known study on *Cities with Little Crime* that "Switzerland represents an exception to the general rule that a high crime rate accompanies a high degree of affluence, industrialization, and urbanization" (Clinard 1978, p. 1). This conclusion was partly based on a comparison with Sweden. Clinard argued that violent crime was—in the early 1970s—more frequent and increasing faster in Sweden than in Switzerland despite its similar standard of living, comparable degree of urbanisation and similar population size. He postulated that a relatively smooth process of urbanisation, a low degree of political centralisation, and a strong social control of the family resulting in a more integrated juvenile generation, were among the main reasons for these differences (Clinard 1978, p. 154).

Recent research suggests that the difference between the two countries may be less unequivocal than Clinard presumed (Balvig 1990; Killias et al. 1998; Niggli and Pfister 1997). According to national police statistics, rates of completed homicides in the early 1990s were almost identical (Switzerland 1.3 per 100,000; Sweden 1.4 per 100,000). In contrast, crime rates for assault, robbery, and rape appear to be much lower in Switzerland than in Sweden according to national police statistics. Yet much of this disparity may result from diverging data gathering systems rather than factual differences. Sweden has a centralised and highly sophisticated system for compiling data on crimes brought to the knowledge of the police. In contrast, Swiss crime statistics have frequently been described as incomplete (for example, national data are missing for simple assault as well as non-genital sexual coercion) and rather poorly developed (Eisner 1997; Killias 1991; Niggli and Pfister 1997). Furthermore, the Swiss penal law distinguishes between crimes that are compulsorily charged and crimes that are not. In particular, simple assault is prosecuted upon request of the victim only. This gives the police the possibility of convincing a person to withdraw his complaint. No systematic research exists on this aspect of recording practices. Qualitative evidence suggests that non-recording does occur. But the proportion of cases affected is unknown at present.

Also, results from the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) only partly support the notion of significantly more violence in Swedish society (Mayhew and Van Dijk 1997; Van Dijk et al. 1991). Average annual victimisation rates quoted for both countries in Mayhew and Van Dijk (1997) show that there appears to exist no difference as regards robbery (0.7% victimised last year in Switzerland; 0.4% in Sweden). However, Swedish
respondents report experiences of assault and threat considerably more frequently (3.6% victimised last year) than the Swiss (2.1%). As to sexual offences, the 1996 ICVS survey distinguishes between sexual assault and sexually offensive behaviour. The respective figures for sexual assault are almost identical (1.9% in Switzerland, 2.0% in Sweden), while offensive behaviour was reported more often in Sweden (3.9%) than in Switzerland (2.0%; M. Killias, personal communication).

Table II shows violent crime rates as reported by the police in Stockholm and Basel. We include data on completed homicide, assault, robbery, and rape. As for assault, our data include both homicide and violence against a public official in each city. The data suggest that police recorded assault rates are considerably higher in Stockholm than in Basel. In part, this difference may be due to lower reporting rates as well as poorer recording practices in Basel. Yet lower assault rates are also found in the ICVS as well as national crime statistics. We thus assume that assault is actually less frequent in Basel than in Stockholm, although little can be said about the magnitude of the difference. Police recorded robbery rates are consistently higher in Stockholm than in Basel. It should be noticed that robbery constitutes a blurred statistical category, however. In particular, bag snatchings are dealt with differently in Stockholm and Basel. In Stockholm, bag snatchings are recorded as robbery if some element of physical violence is part of the offence. In Basel, all bag snatchings were originally counted as a separate category. But from 1993 onwards both robberies and bag snatchings have been collapsed into one statistical category. In our study, bag snatching is included in the robbery data. The robbery rates for Basel are thus based on a wider definition than for Stockholm. It appears likely, therefore, that robbery is actually less frequent in Basel than in Stockholm. Rape is also recorded considerably less frequently in Basel than in Stockholm. Our category of rape includes genital intercourse and other types of sexual compulsion in both cities. Yet we doubt whether these figures can be interpreted as real differences. We rather

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Completed Homicide</th>
<th>Assault*</th>
<th>Robbery*</th>
<th>Rape</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980-84</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-89</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including homicide.

b Robbery data for the city of Basel include bag snatchings.
assumed that the level of tolerance for rape may be lower in Stockholm (that is, a higher rate of reporting). An assumption that is supported by the fact that the sexual assault rate in the victim surveys is almost equal in Switzerland and in Sweden.

**VIOLENT CRIME IN THE URBAN CONTEXT**

Everyday life in an urban community may affect the occurrence of violent crimes in a variety of ways. A now widely accepted theoretical concept distinguishes between two basic dimensions (Bottoms 1994; Wikström 1998). Firstly, the organisation of everyday life in a specific context may result in more or less (mostly young and male) persons with strong dispositions to act violently. This dimension has traditionally been emphasised by social disorganisation theory (Kornhauser 1978; Sampson and Groves 1989). It basically holds that community variation in social and economic resources, and the related ability of communities to create shared rules for behaviour influences the level of criminal potential (for an overview see Wikström 1998). Secondly, the organisation of everyday life in a community creates specific patterns of interactions and social situations. These situations may be liable to aggressive conflict or strategic violence in vastly different degrees. In this vein, the routine activity approach emphasises the crucial importance of situational factors in explaining variation of violent crime between communities (Cohen and Felson 1979; Felson 1994). In the following sections we shall first discuss two situational aspects of violent crime. We then analyse some aspects of offender rates in urban neighbourhoods.

**The Social Context of Violent Crime**

Violent crimes are known to occur typically in diverse situational contexts (Birkbeck and LaFree 1993; McClintock 1963). Police recorded rates of violent crime are considerably lower in Basel than in Stockholm. One may therefore ask whether the situational structure of police recorded violent crime differs between the two cities. In order to assess this question, we compared the social contexts of violent crime in Stockholm and Basel. In analysing the contextual distribution of violent offences we employed the classification scheme developed by McClintock (McClintock 1963) and modified by Wikström (Wikström 1991, pp. 49–56). The contextual classification is based primarily on the interpersonal relationship between victim and offender as well as on the basic types of the scene of a crime. It has five main classes.
The first includes all cases of violence within the family. The second class refers to cases of violence between non-family acquaintances that takes place in or next to residences. The third class consists of non-family cases of violence in places of public entertainment and is subdivided into three subclasses according to the relationship between offender and victim. In a similar vein, the fourth class includes all cases of violence occurring in streets, squares, and other public places. The fifth main class refers to all cases not covered by one of the four first classes. For example, cases involving strangers in private places (e.g. cars, residences) are included in this category.

Table III shows the social context for Stockholm and Basel for assaults, robberies against the person, and rapes. Certainly the most striking feature of these distributions is the degree of similarity between the two cities (for respective results on Edinburgh see McClintock and Wikström 1992, p. 511). In both cities, assault is a highly heterogeneous group of criminal offences occurring in a wide variety of situational contexts. In socio-geographic respects, two main groups of assault may be distinguished in both cities. Family violence as well as non-family assaults in private, occurs primarily in underprivileged and socially unstable neighbourhoods (for details see Wikström 1991, p. 203; Eisner 1997, p. 140). Assault in public almost exclusively occurs in the inner city area, however. In contrast, the situational context of police recorded robberies is rather homogeneous. Most cases occur in public places in the inner city area and involve strangers. Finally, a high proportion of rapes in both cities is classified as ‘other circumstances’. These are mostly cases where people meet at a restaurant or bar and one

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social context</th>
<th>Assault</th>
<th>Robbery</th>
<th>Rape</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basel</td>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>Basel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Within the family</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Acquaintances, within residences</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Places of public entertainment</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) acquaintances</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) someone at duty/at work</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) strangers/casual acquaintances</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. In public places, involving</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) acquaintances</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) someone at duty/at work</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) strangers/casual acquaintances</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Other circumstances</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) acquaintances</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) someone at duty/at work</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) strangers/casual acquaintances</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
accompanied the other to his/her apartment where the crime took place. Given the considerable differences in crime rates between the two cities, the absence of larger differences as to the contextual structure appears to be somewhat surprising. At least one conclusion may be drawn from this finding. The different levels of violent crime in Basel and Stockholm do not seem to result from a different composition of situational contexts.

Yet we also find one consistent, albeit not very significant, difference between the two cities. The proportion of violent crime within the family is consistently lower in Basel than in Stockholm. Also, other crimes of violence in private tend to account for a somewhat lower proportion in Basel than in Stockholm (for a similar finding as to Edinburgh see McClintock and Wikström 1991, p. 511). In contrast, crimes in places of public entertainment and public places account for a somewhat larger proportion in Basel than in Stockholm.

Rather than indicating a difference in actual crimes, it is most probably due to legal and procedural differences. In Stockholm, victims of family violence were already encouraged to report to the police in the 1980s. Also, police officers in Stockholm are obliged to record any observed cases of family violence. In contrast, programmes for helping victims of family violence have only recently started in Switzerland. Furthermore, in Basel cases of simple assault known to the police are recorded (and legally prosecuted) only upon the explicit request of the victim.

**Temporal Variations of Violent Crime**

It has long been noted that various temporal rhythms are related to the occurrence of violent crime. Besides annual and seasonal variation, probably the most interesting variations are fluctuation by daytime and weekday. Although it is well known that most violent crime is concentrated during weekend nights, little systematic research has investigated the determinants of this distribution. From a routine activity perspective, temporal variations of violent crime may be related to variations of typical activities and interactions taking place in an urban community. Activity patterns in a community, in turn, may be explained as resulting from broader institutional patterns in a society (e.g. working times), workings of the real estate market (e.g. rise of entertainment areas), and the preference for specific life-styles. At least two causal mechanisms may account for the link between temporal variations in violent crime and routine activities in a community. The temporal incidence of more instrumental types of violence (e.g. robbery) may primarily be influenced by *strategic considerations* such as the availability of victims and the chance of getting identified. More expressive types of
violence (e.g. fights, brawls in bars), by contrast, may rather be associated with the temporal distribution of conflict-prone types of activities. In this vein, results from the Basel study show two distinct time patterns for robbery on the one hand and all other types of violence on the other (Eisner 1997, pp. 132–133). Robbery tends to be most frequent in the evening hours (16:00–20:00). Other types of violence, in contrast, peak considerably later at between 23:00 and 01:00.

The concentration of much violence in the evening and during leisure-time periods seems to be rather universal. In general terms, thus, temporal variations of violent crime are quite similar in both cities. Yet there also appear to exist some differences worthy of further consideration. Consider assault, for example. For comparing the two cities, we calculated an indicator that represents the average assault rate per hour in each city. For example, if the total assault rate during a year is 800 per 100,000 and 10% of the assaults are committed at the hour 23:00–23:59, the respective crime rate is 80 for that hour. Hence, the sum of all 'per hour' crime rates is identical to the overall crime rate in a given year.

Figure 1 displays the respective series. It shows that assaults tend to become more frequent during the afternoon and evening hours and peak around midnight in both cities. Yet the figure also shows an astonishing difference between the two cities. While relative differences are modest during most of the day, Stockholm has considerably higher crime rates during the late evening hours. Furthermore, assaults tend to be more highly concentrated during weekends in Stockholm than in Basel. For example, 44% of all simple assaults recorded in Stockholm during 1982 took place

![Figure 1. Assault rate per hour and per 1,000,000 population, Basel and Stockholm.](image-url)
We thus find that much of the overall between city difference in assault rates may be primarily due to more assaults taking place during weekend nights in Stockholm. This astonishing difference may be related to broader cultural differences in activity patterns. Thus a large proportion of assaults on weekend nights takes place between young men in places of public entertainment. Their readiness to engage in situational conflicts may depend on several variables. For example, according to the WHO Health of Youth survey, Swiss young men are much less likely to get seriously drunk at the age of 16 than their Swedish counterparts (King et al. 1997). There may thus exist a cultural difference between the two countries in the degree to which young men expect to drink large amounts of alcohol among friends during weekend nights. Possibly this difference accounts for at least part of the differing time pattern in the two cities.

The Use of Weapons in Violent Crimes

A noteworthy difference as regards violent crime rates in Basel and Stockholm concerns the ratio between homicide and other types of violence. Thus, rates of completed homicides seem to be quite similar in both cities. Yet police recorded assaults, robberies, and rapes are considerably less frequent in Basel. Notice, for example, that the average odds ratio between homicide and assault is 1:15 in Basel and 1:30 in Stockholm. There may be two explanations for this difference. Firstly, less serious incidents of violent crime may be more strongly under-represented in Basel than in Stockholm. Homicide rates are thus closer to actual differences while assault rates would be more strongly influenced by gaps in reporting and recording. Secondly, there may exist a real difference in the probability that a violent event results in the death of a person. A reason for this may be the differential presence of lethal weapons.

Table IV displays the proportion of weapons used in both cities by type of crime according to our crime surveys. In both cities, the presence of weapons (as mentioned in the police record) was coded irrespective whether it was actually used during the crime or not. The data show that the proportion of crimes committed without a weapon hardly differs between the two cities (with the notable exception of homicide). If the presence of a weapon is interpreted as a proxy for the severity of crime, then these data do not support the notion that less serious incidents are more strongly under-represented in Basel than in Stockholm. In contrast, there is a consistently higher proportion of violent crimes with firearms being involved.
TABLE IV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons used</th>
<th>Homicide</th>
<th>Assault</th>
<th>Robbery</th>
<th>Rape</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No weapons</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointed (e.g. knives)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns and rifles</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Homicide figures for Stockholm refer to the 1951–1987 period, see Wikström (1992).*

in Basel than in Stockholm. Except for homicide, absolute percentages are low in both cities. Yet the relative share is about four times higher in Basel than in Stockholm. These findings suggest that the wider distribution of guns in Basel does not generally lead to higher overall levels of violent crime. Yet the relative risk of a lethal outcome appears to be higher when a violent crime does occur (see also Killias 1990).

OFFENDERS IN URBAN COMMUNITIES

It has long been noticed that there is dramatic variation between urban communities as to their characteristic offender rates. One of the key findings in Shaw and McKay’s (1969) pioneering work on juvenile offender rates in Chicago was the great area variation in juvenile offender rates. Since then a great number of Anglo-American studies has confirmed that offender rates are highly skewed when compared between urban neighbourhoods (see e.g. Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Schmid 1960). Recent work has concentrated on the relative effect of emergent community characteristics and individual level factors on offending.

Both the concentration of offenders in some urban areas and the higher overall levels of some types of crime in cities have frequently been seen as emerging from the same causal factors. The basic argument is as follows: the larger a city is, the more different groups tend to become — *ceteris paribus* — spatially segregated. The more spatially and socially segregated the urban space is, the greater is the likelihood that there will be some urban communities with high levels of social instability and concentrations of urban poverty. They create, firstly, situational circumstances and, secondly, conditions of socialisation favourable to higher levels of crime (Wikström 1991, p. 130). For this reason, large cities are expected to have both a higher spatial concentration of offender rates and a higher overall crime rate. In this vein, Clinard (1978) explained the low crime rates in Switzerland during
the 1960s as a result of the low concentration of marginal groups in Swiss cities. Following this argument, we explore offender rate concentrations as well as area-covariates of offender rates in this section.

**The Area Concentration of Violent Offenders**

Inter-city comparisons of area distributions (using, for example, dissimilarity indexes or Lorenz Curves) of aggregate variables (such as, for example, offender rates) are not unproblematic. Firstly, different degrees of overlap between statistical ward (or block) divisions and actual neighbourhoods are known to be a potential source of error. Also, different levels of statistical aggregation (that is, different average population size of wards) have been identified as creating complications. In the case of comparing Stockholm and Basel, however, these difficulties seem not to be too influential. In both cities wards usually correspond to historically grown neighbourhoods and frequently follow ‘natural’ barriers such as railway tracks, water lines, or large streets. Also, the population range and average size of wards is quite similar in both cities. In both cities, wards with a population of less than 300 were excluded from further analyses. In Stockholm, there are 123 statistical wards with an average population size of approximately 5,200. In Basel, there are 63 statistical wards with an average population of approximately 3,100. For practical purposes these values appear to be sufficiently similar to allow for meaningful comparisons.

Yet three methodological restrictions should be considered. Firstly, in Stockholm repeated offenders are counted as often as they appear in the police records, while in Basel each individual offender is counted only once. Yet there are very few multiple offenders in the Stockholm violent offenders series and the difference may thus be considered negligible (Wikström 1991, p. 134). Secondly, it should be borne in mind that offenders known to the police do not constitute a random fraction of the offenders who have committed a police recorded crime. The main reason is that clear-up rates vary considerably by contextual factors (for example, the personal relationship between offender and victim). Thirdly, in both cities both age-standardised and ordinary offender rates were calculated. However, because the method utilised for computing age-standardised rates differs between the two cities, only results based on ordinary offender rates (per 10,000 residents aged 10 and older) are presented here.

Table V shows two related measures of the degree of offender rate concentration for both Stockholm and Basel. Firstly, it displays the distribution of offenders by quartiles of the wards after sorting the wards according to offender rates. For example, Table V shows that the wards
with the lowest offender rates and having one quarter of the population only have 8% of all offenders. Secondly, Table V displays the Gini-coefficient as an aggregate measure of the offender rate distribution. For illustrative reasons, we also display the respective distribution data computed by Shaw and McKay in their original work about Chicago (Shaw and McKay 1969). The data first confirm that violent offender rates are highly skewed in both cities. While a large number of urban neighbourhoods contribute very few percent to the urban total of offenders, a few wards have very high rates of violent offenders.

Yet surprisingly the data suggest that the degree of spatial segregation of violent offenders may be even higher in Basel than in Stockholm. Thus the quartile distribution of offenders in Basel is considerably more skewed than in Stockholm and almost identical to the one in Chicago during the 1930s. As wards are somewhat smaller in Basel than in Stockholm (and smaller units tend to produce higher levels of spatial inequality), the difference should be interpreted with some caution. Yet at any rate these results do not support the notion that the lower overall level of violent crime in Basel might be due to a lesser degree of offender concentration in some urban neighbourhoods.

**Neighbourhood Characteristics and Offender Rates**

Given that violent offenders are highly concentrated in some areas, our next step is to analyse correlates of offender rates in the urban context. In earlier research, Wikström (1985, 1991) performed factor analyses for identifying basic dimensions underlying the urban space in Stockholm. He found three basic dimensions, which he called ‘familism’, ‘social problems (disorganisation)’, and ‘low SES’. Eisner (1997, p. 185)

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lowest quartile</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second quartile</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third quartile</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest quartile</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini-coefficient</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

performed similar factor analyses for Basel and also found three basic factors, which he called 'low social status', 'individualism (low familism)', and 'social disorganisation'. Both authors have performed multivariate analyses with offender rates as the dependent variable. They show that social disorganisation has the highest predictive power followed by low socio-economic status in both cities. As to familism, Wikström (1991, p. 169) found a significant effect of low familism on offender rates in Stockholm while Eisner (1997, p. 187) did not find any such effect in Basel. Yet the variables used in both cities differed somewhat and the factor solutions are not wholly identical in both cities (which is not to be expected anyway). In future research we will evaluate more thoroughly the possibility of testing causal models for both cities simultaneously.

At the present stage of our research, we have presented selected bivariate correlates of violent offender rates in both cities. Table VI displays zero-order correlations for a number of variables that have often been used within the framework of social disorganisation theory. For convenience, the variables have been grouped into four broad groups, which largely correspond to the three dimensions found in factor analyses as well as some selected

| TABLE VI |
| Zero-order correlations of violent offender rates in Basel and Stockholm. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stockholm</th>
<th>Basel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A) Demographic characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% ages &lt; 15 years</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% ages &lt; 65 years</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.41**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B) Social status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% working class occupation</td>
<td>0.43**</td>
<td>0.44**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% owner occupied</td>
<td>-0.46**</td>
<td>-0.43**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% one-family houses</td>
<td>-0.35**</td>
<td>-0.41**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M²-per person</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.49**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% large dwellings</td>
<td>-0.36**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% university students at ages 18–29</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.45**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C) Familism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% single-parent families</td>
<td>0.36**</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household mean size</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.27**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% divorced</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.48**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D) Social problems (disorganisation)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% immigrants</td>
<td>0.42**</td>
<td>0.61**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential stability</td>
<td>-0.45**</td>
<td>-0.60**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% unemployed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.55**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% social security</td>
<td>0.50**</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N = 125) (N = 63)

* Residential stability: for Stockholm: proportion of residents not moving out in one year; for Basel: Proportion of residents living > 5 years in same area.
demographic variables. Looking at demographic characteristics first, one finds no significant correlation with violent offender rates in Stockholm. As to Basel, however, the results suggest that offender rates tend to be higher in wards with a low proportion of older residents. This second correlation suggests that ordinary offender rates in Basel may be affected by the age composition of urban neighbourhoods.

For both Basel and Stockholm a number of variables measure aspects of the socio-economic status of an urban neighbourhood. The respective zero-order correlations with offender rates show a strikingly similar pattern in both cities. Indeed, the three variables available for both cities (percentage working class, percentage owner occupied houses, and percentage single-family households) have almost identical coefficients in both cities. These findings obviously corroborate earlier research on the higher concentration of violent offenders in urban areas with a low social status.

A third group of variables refers to some aspects of familism/individualism. Household mean size is weakly (and negatively) correlated with offender rates in Basel, but not in Stockholm. The percentage of families with one parent only is related to offender rates in Stockholm but not in Basel. Yet the divorce indicator—often used in social disorganisation research—covaries considerably with offender rates in Basel. All in all, results for this group of variables are not very consistent.

A final group of variables represents various aspects of social disorganisation. Two included variables are available in both cities, namely the residential stability of the community, and the degree of heterogeneity as measured by the proportion of residents with a foreign nationality. Residential instability and population heterogeneity are positively related to offender rates, but more strongly so in Basel than in Stockholm. The proportion of persons receiving social security benefits correlates positively with violent offender rates in Stockholm. In a similar vein, offender rates covary with unemployment rates in Basel. In both cities, therefore, we find highly consistent correlations between indicators of social disorganisation and violent offender rates.

**Conclusions**

In this article we have presented the first results from a comparative analysis of the situational context, the ecology of crime, and of offender residences in Basel and Stockholm. We find impressive evidence of basic similarities in the situational context of violent crime and the residential distribution
of violent offenders. Yet we also find significant differences, some of which may have interesting implications for crime prevention. Firstly, violent crime seems to be more highly concentrated during weekend nights in Stockholm than in Basel. To go out, get drunk, and become involved in some fight appears to occur more frequently in Stockholm. We suggest that culturally transmitted behavioural expectations among young men during weekend nights might account for this difference. Secondly, we find evidence that the presence of weapons in a community increases the risk of more serious outcomes of violent events. Efforts to reduce the availability of weapons may thus have significant effects on the outcomes of violence, but not necessarily on its frequency. Thirdly, we show that offenders in both cities are highly concentrated in socially disorganised communities with few economic and social resources.

REFERENCES


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ABSTRACT. The author, among others, has developed a system that empowers communities to organise themselves to engage in outcome focused prevention planning. This system for prevention planning using the tools of prevention science is Communities That Care (CTC). In a collaborative US project 22 reliable and valid archival indicators of 12 major risk factors that predict rates of adolescent drug use at the county level were found. This collaborative project has also developed a validated school survey that measures risk, protection, delinquency and drug use outcomes reliably across states and ethnic groups. It allows a diagnosis of risk and protection levels in any geographical area, from a state to a neighbourhood. With these tools, communities can organise themselves to engage in outcome focused prevention planning, objectively assess their own profiles of risk and protection, and choose and implement effective strategies to address their unique strengths and needs. In Europe CTC has been currently introduced in England and Wales, Scotland and in the Netherlands.

KEY WORDS: community, crime prevention, evaluation, neighbourhood, predictive tools, prevention policies, social development model

I first became convinced of the importance of crime prevention as a probation officer. I worked daily with young people aged 12–17 years referred for delinquent behaviour and drug abuse. Over time I came to see my job as something akin to operating an expensive ambulance service at the bottom of a cliff. As probation staff, we were the emergency team patching up those who fell over the edge. That experience convinced me that if we want to reduce crime, we must seriously broaden our work beyond the criminal justice system to include prevention.

We must incarcerate serious repeat offenders. We must protect our communities. However, we cannot afford to limit our crime control policies to waiting until people commit crimes, then imprisoning them or putting them under court supervision for long periods. Why? Huge public investment in prisons is required to keep up with rising rates of incarceration. As shown in Figure 1, today in the US we are imprisoning people at over six times the rate we did from 1929 through 1974. Over 450 people per 100,000 are in prison in the US, and the number is rising exponentially (Maguire and Pastore 1998). Far too many of those imprisoned are people of colour. We cannot expect to control government spending while we imprison increasing proportions of the population. We cannot arrest and incarcerate our way out of the problem of crime. We need an effective strategy for preventing crime in the first place.
But prevention, historically, has been a shaky proposition — good in principle, not much to show in the way of effectiveness. The risk in prevention is that it will not work, or worse, that prevention efforts could do more harm than good. Good ideas, even when well implemented, do not guarantee success. In the 1970s, school-based drug information programmes were the preferred approach to drug abuse prevention in the US. But, when evaluated, drug information alone was found to increase drug use among teens, perhaps because their interest was aroused (Weaver and Tennant 1973). In the past two decades prevention has grown from an idea to a science (Coie et al. 1993). Prevention science is based on research on malleable risk and protective factors that predict crimes. Preventive interventions are targeted at identified predictors of crime. Our challenge now is to use prevention science to guide policy and action in communities and neighbourhoods.

PREVENTION SCIENCE AND CRIME

It is instructive to review how prevention science has been applied to the prevention of cardiovascular disease. Public health researchers first
identified risk factors whose presence increased risk for cardiovascular
disease: tobacco use, high-fat diet, sedentary lifestyle, high levels of stress,
and a family history of heart disease. Equally important, they found that
certain protective factors such as aerobic exercise, a low fat diet, and
relaxation techniques helped prevent the development of heart problems.

Concerned with halting the onset of heart disease, public health
researchers in the US designed strategies to engage communities in reducing
identified risk factors for heart disease, and in promoting the adoption of
health and lifestyle choices that promote protective factors. Those efforts
have paid off. We have seen major changes in the way Americans live. Today,
no one smokes in public buildings or aeroplanes. Today, in the US, exercise
is expected. Restaurants in the US now identify heart healthy foods on the
menu. Accompanying these changes has been an over 40% decrease in
cardiovascular disease in the US over the past 30 years.

The idea of reducing known predictors and enhancing known protective
factors in order to prevent problems is fundamental to prevention science.
My colleagues and I have been working with communities to use the tools
of prevention science to prevent crime among adolescents and young adults.
We have seen a major breakthrough in the development of the research base
for prevention science in the last 20 years. Longitudinal studies conducted
in Europe, North America and New Zealand have identified factors associated
with neighbourhoods and communities, family and school experiences, peer
groups, and individuals themselves that increase the probability of later crime
in adolescence and young adulthood. Many of these factors, shown in Figure
2, have been found to increase the probability of substance abuse, teen
pregnancy, and dropping out of school as well.

Some youngsters, even though they are exposed to multiple risk factors,
do not succumb to criminal behaviour. Research indicates that protective
factors can reduce the impact of negative risk exposure. These protective
factors include:

- individual characteristics: high intelligence, a resilient temperament and
  positive social orientation;
- bonding positive relationships with family members, teachers, or other
  adults;
- healthy beliefs and clear standards including clear expectations in family,
  school or neighbourhood that criminal behaviour is not acceptable;
- opportunities for pro-social involvement in family, school and community;
- reinforcement for pro-social involvement in family, school and
  community;
- competencies or skills.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Factors</th>
<th>Substance Abuse</th>
<th>Delinquency</th>
<th>Teen Pregnancy</th>
<th>School Drop-Out</th>
<th>Violence</th>
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<td>Community</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Availability of Firearms</td>
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<td>Family</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Favourable Parental Attitudes and Involvement in the Problem Behaviour</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>School</td>
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<td>Early and Persistent Anti-Social Behaviour</td>
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<td>Individual/Peer</td>
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<td>Alienation and Rebelliousness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friends Who Engage in the Problem Behaviour</td>
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<tr>
<td>Favourable Attitudes Toward the Problem Behaviour</td>
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<td>Early Initiation of the Problem Behaviour</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constitutional Factors</td>
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Figure 2. Adolescent problem behaviours.
An important finding about risk and protective factors concerns the cumulative effect of exposure to multiple factors. As shown in Figures 3 and 4, data from state-wide probability samples of secondary school students in the States of Kansas, Maine, Oregon, South Carolina, and Washington show that increased risk exposure is associated with an increase in the prevalence of arrests and of violent behaviour self reported by adolescents, while greater protection is associated with lower prevalence of these indicators of delinquency at any level of risk exposure (Pollard et al. forthcoming). This evidence about the cumulative effects of exposure to multiple risk and protective factors suggests that strategies that include multiple components focused on several predictors of youth crime hold most promise for prevention.

How can communities implement comprehensive prevention strategies whose components complement each other and achieve synergistic effects? An approach we have been exploring is to encourage communities to adopt a shared conceptual framework to guide all their prevention work, regardless of the organisation, group or agency conducting the prevention effort. The framework we use is called the social development model (SDM). Consistent with recent research, the SDM hypothesises that strong bonds to school, family and community serve as protective factors against behaviours that violate socially accepted standards for behaviour. Attachment, a positive emotional link, a personal investment in the group,
and commitment, are the component elements of such social bonds. The theory hypothesises that when social groups produce strong bonds of attachment and commitment in members and promote clear standards for behaviour, these groups increase behaviour consistent with those standards and prevent behaviour that violates them.

The SDM hypothesises that the interplay of specific factors during development influences the degree to which children develop strong social bonds to family, school, peer groups or the larger community. The factors that affect children’s bonding are the degree of opportunity for active involvement available in the family, classroom, and community, the skills possessed and applied by children during participation in these settings, and the reinforcements provided to children in response to their behaviour in these settings.

The benefit of having a shared conceptual framework is that it allows all those involved with children in the community, from parents, to teachers, to neighbours, to law enforcement officers engaged in community policing, to focus on the same goals. Each organisation and individual can ask: how do I promote clear, healthy standards for behaviour, and how does this organisation, or how do I, ensure that young people have developmentally appropriate opportunities/skills to be successful, and ensure recognition for their efforts?

We have seen a second major breakthrough in prevention science. Over the past 10 years remarkable advances have been made in the development
and testing of effective preventive interventions. There is now clear evidence that prevention actions that reduce risk and enhance protection can prevent later criminal behaviour. (Brewer et al. 1995; Catalano et al. 1998; Greenwood et al. 1998; Yoshikawa 1994). As an example, a study we conducted found that a comprehensive programme for children aged 6 to 12 that sought to reduce shared risks and enhance protection in family and school in a manner consistent with the social development strategy, prevented violence, heavy alcohol use and high risk sexual activity by age 18 (Hawkins et al. 1999).

There is a growing menu of actions that effectively reduce risk and enhance protection (Developmental Research and Programs 1996). It is possible now to move to outcome focused prevention, that is, to design systems for risk reduction and protective factor enhancement to achieve specified prevention outcomes. This knowledge comes at a good time. Increasingly, across the globe, people are coming to understand that communities must design and take control of their own strategies for insuring the healthy development of their children. Prevention must be owned and operated by the community if it is to work. This realisation has led in the
US to the creation of legislation and executive actions that seek to allow local communities to develop and implement plans better suited to their own needs. Unfortunately, the road to the goal has not always been smooth. Often in communities people come together, agreeing to collaborate and work together, until money is mentioned. Then people begin to suggest their favourite preventive actions and programmes. Seeing the world from their different perspectives, each trusts best the tools he or she knows. Child protective services workers argue for more resources for home visitors, teachers request resources for reading tutors, police request funds for more DARE officers.

**Five Phases**

Profiles of protection and risk vary in different communities. Therefore, different preventive actions may be required in individual communities to promote positive development and prevent crime. We have been working with states and communities to match and select preventive interventions to address each community's own unique profile of risk and protection. This work has required the development and validation of tools that allow communities to create objective data based profiles of their levels of risk and protection, and trends in these over time. In a collaborative project involving the States of Kansas, Maine, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, and Washington, we have identified 22 reliable and valid archival indicators of 12 major risk factors that predict rates of adolescent drug use at the county level. This collaborative project has also developed a validated school survey that measures risk, protection, delinquency and drug use outcomes reliably across states and ethnic groups. It allows a diagnosis of risk and protection levels in any geographical area, from a state to a neighbourhood. With these tools, communities can organise themselves to engage in outcome focused prevention planning, objectively assess their own profiles of risk and protection, and choose and implement effective strategies to address their unique strengths and needs.

We have developed a system that empowers communities to organise themselves to engage in outcome focused prevention planning. This system for prevention planning using the tools of prevention science is Communities That Care (CTC). CTC guides communities in organising and operating the promotion of positive social development for young people and prevention of youth crime. CTC allows those who use it to select prevention policies, actions and programmes that best address the unique profile of risk and protection of their community. In this way, CTC functions like an
operating system on a computer, allowing the user to select the programme needed to achieve the user’s goals.

Communities use a five-phase process to install the CTC operating system. In the first phase, entitled the Readiness Phase, those concerned with preventing youth crime and promoting positive youth development assess their community’s readiness to use the CTC system. This involves defining the community that will be involved, identifying key stakeholders in the community who should be engaged in the process, assessing current conditions, activities, and initiatives already operating in the community, and assessing conditions that could inhibit successful installation of the CTC operating system in the community. Communities where key stakeholders do not view positive youth development or the prevention of youth crime as priorities, or communities whose key stakeholders are unwilling to work together toward shared goals, do not have a high degree of readiness for using CTC. In such communities, building community readiness is necessary before installing the CTC system.

Phase two of CTC introduces and involves the community in the CTC process. This phase educates key community stakeholders about prevention science and engages them in the CTC planning process. CTC seeks to engage both grassroots community members concerned with youth crime and youth development, and key leaders of the community who control resources and influence public opinion. In this phase, stakeholders develop a vision for the future of their community’s children and create or designate an organisational structure for carrying out the activities necessary to move the community toward the vision. The structure includes a board of key leaders who head the diverse sectors, organisations and agencies of the community that address youth development and youth crime. This key leader board oversees CTC planning and implementation activities and, in phase five, secures resources to implement the community’s strategic prevention plan developed through the CTC process. The structure also includes a planning team or community board with broad representation of the community’s diversity, whose members conduct community assessments in phase three and use the results to draft the community’s strategic youth development and prevention plan in phase four.

In phase three, the community board develops a data based profile of the community’s strengths and challenges. This phase requires collecting community specific data on levels of risk factors, protective factors and crime and other problem behaviours in the community’s neighbourhoods. The CTC Youth Survey and validated archival indicators of risk and outcomes are used for this purpose. The result is a complete picture of what is promoting healthy behaviour and what factors are contributing to crime
risk in the community. This requires more than surveys or law enforcement records that measure crime. Measures of risk and protective factors must be included to identify the appropriate foci for action to prevent crime in each community.

The community board analyses these data to identify risk factors that are elevated or trending in an unwanted direction when compared with national and/or state levels of risk. Objective profiles of risk provide a basis for developing consensus about community action priorities. The board can use these findings in several ways. First, the results can be used to focus resources on areas or neighbourhoods where children and adolescents are being exposed to greatest risk as illustrated in Figure 6, showing the three neighbourhoods in a community where overall risk exposure is highest.

Secondly, the results are used to prioritise a subset of two to five risk factors that will be addressed in the board's strategic plan. As illustrated in Figures 7 and 8, different neighbourhoods or communities confront different profiles of risk. Preventive actions should be designed to address the specific risks that are elevated in the community or neighbourhood of concern.

In this phase, the CTC board also takes an inventory of existing community resources that currently address their priority risk factors and seek to enhance protective factors. This resource assessment facilitates the development of a strategic plan that builds on existing community resources, avoids duplication of effort, and fills gaps in existing policies and programmes.

In phase four, the board creates a comprehensive youth development plan for the community. The plan first involves defining desired outcomes in the reduction of prioritised risk factors and enhancement of protective factors. Communities use their baseline assessment of risk and protective factors to develop clear, measurable outcomes expressed as changes in levels of prioritised risks and protective factors that will be accomplished by a specified time. Specifying these outcomes establishes criteria for evaluating the success of the plan later. Specifying outcomes also helps to clarify what specific policies, actions and programmes need to be put in place to achieve the desired outcomes.

Having specified their risk reduction and protective factor enhancement outcomes, the community board reviews 'promising approaches', that is policies, actions and programmes that have been tested and shown to be effective in changing their focal risk and protective factors. The board selects specific tested actions that have been effective in reducing the risk factors the board has prioritised and creates an action plan for implementing new programmes and policies and expanding or enhancing existing resources
Figure 6. Total aggregated risk factors perspective.
that address these prioritised risks. The board also develops an evaluation plan for collecting and analysing data to measure progress toward the specified outcomes over time. The CTC process involves a reassessment of the community’s profile of risk and protection every two to three years to monitor changes in risk and protection profiles associated with implementation of the plan.

Figure 7. Risk Profile for Neighbourhood #3.

Figure 8. Risk Profile for Neighbourhood #2.
The fifth phase of CTC involves implementation and evaluation of the plan. This requires the identification or development of resources to support the plan. Involvement of the key leader board is important to secure the needed resources. Implementation is facilitated by defining clear expectations and roles for implementing groups and organisations, by developing information systems that support communication across implementing organisations, by frequent communication with the community regarding opportunities for contributing to the plan’s implementation, and by monitoring progress towards desired outcomes.

CTC’s research based system for helping communities to use prevention science to guide their prevention policies and programmes has been used increasingly by communities concerned about the social development of their children and the prevention of crime and related problems. The CTC operating system has been adopted by the US Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) as the framework for the Office’s Title V Delinquency Prevention programme. CTC has been implemented in over 500 communities across the United States in the past decade. In the United Kingdom, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation has provided funding to establish CTC-UK and a test of CTC in three UK pilot sites in Barnsley, Coventry and Swansea. CTC-UK has created the British edition of CTC that includes a menu of promising approaches available in the UK and a youth survey tailored for British adolescents. CTC-UK is assisting communities in Scotland, England and Wales to install the CTC operating system. In the Netherlands, based on an international review of crime prevention strategies, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sport are collaborating to provide funding to translate and adapt CTC for the Netherlands and to install and test CTC in four pilot communities.

Outcomes

Evaluations of the CTC operating system have focused both on process and outcomes. Studies have shown that, with adequate training in CTC, community key leaders and boards adopt a research based approach to prevention planning (Greenberg et al. 1999), collect and analyse risk and protective factor data from their communities, and use these data to make decisions to select research based policies and programmes to address their unique profiles of risk and protection (Arthur et al. forthcoming; Harachi et al. 1996). In a Report to Congress on the Title V programme, OJJDP reported the following positive changes in communities trained to use the CTC operating system:
1. improved inter-agency collaboration;
2. reduced duplication of services;
3. co-ordinated allocation of resources;
4. strategic targeting of prevention activities to priority risk and protective factors;
5. increased use of research based ‘promising approaches’ with demonstrated effectiveness;
6. increased involvement of professionals, citizens and youth in community prevention activities (OJJDP 1996).

An evaluation conducted by the US General Accounting Office found that communities using the CTC strategy leveraged the Title V funds they received from the federal government with local and state funds to double the resources available for delinquency prevention (US General Accounting Office 1996). A state-wide evaluation of delinquency prevention programmes using CTC in the State of Iowa found that the operating system “generated significant enthusiasm and commitment among professionals and citizens [. . . ] (the) prevention initiative had involved citizens who were unfamiliar with youth problems in the process of finding solutions to crime and delinquency.” (Jenson et al. 1997)

Desired reductions in risk factors and crime have been reported from communities using CTC (OJJDP 1997). For example, based on their risk and resource assessment using the CTC process, Buchanan County, Missouri, prioritised three risk factors for attention: early and persistent anti-social behaviour, academic failure, and low commitment to school. They planned and implemented a programme to reduce these prioritised risks. During the 1996–97 school year, 81% of students in the programme improved failing grades in two or more core subjects to passing grades. There has been a 78% decrease in truancy, a 62% decrease in tardiness, a 31% reduction in school discipline referrals, and a 33% reduction in juvenile crime in the community. While such reports are encouraging, a randomised controlled trial to test the effectiveness of the CTC operating system that controls for threats to internal validity remains to be funded and conducted. Currently, CTC’s risk and protective focused approach to prevention is being tested in the US in a natural experiment comparing 40 communities in seven states. The five-year study is funded by the National Institute on Drug Abuse, the OJJDP, the US Department of Education, and the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention.

It is important to include prevention in efforts to reduce crime in communities across the globe. The growing knowledge base regarding risk and protective factors for crime and delinquency and the growing list of
tested policies and programmes for reducing risk, enhancing protection and preventing crime should be used by communities seeking to effectively prevent crime before it happens. CTC offers communities a research based strategy for re-inventing themselves as protective environments for the positive development of children and the prevention of crime. 84% of communities are addressing and seeking to change community risks/ enhance community levels of protection; 70% address school risk factors; 68% address family risk factors; 50% address peer risk factors; 65% address individual risk factors; communities are using multiple strategies focused on multiple domains.

CTC has allowed local communities to act and federal, state, and local governments to support that action with funding, with confidence in what is being done. At the same time, the CTC process generates local resources for prevention.

We now have the tools to re-invent our communities as protective environments for the positive development of all children, so that children grow up free from the scourge of violence and crime. It is possible to promote the development of CTC enough to ensure that all children, regardless of race, culture, or class are bonded to family, school, and community and are committed to the highest standards and healthy values for their own futures, free from the threat of violence.

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LOCAL CRIME PREVENTION AND ITS NATIONAL SUPPORT: ORGANISATION AND DIRECTION

ABSTRACT. This article is a short summary of some of the key elements in a 1996 report to the Swedish Ministry of Justice. The study was commissioned to the authors as a part of the Government's work of creating a National Crime Prevention Programme for Sweden. The analysis underlined the importance of co-ordinating the crime-prevention efforts of the legal system and other actors. The level and structure of criminality is subject to considerable local variations. What is, and what is perceived as, problematical behaviour differs considerably from region to region, city to city, and areas within a city. It is thus important that crime-prevention work be based on a description of the problem profile prevailing locally. The complex of problems faced in big cities, for example, is very different from the complex of problems existing in a small provincial town, and the strategies guiding the adoption of appropriate measures in these two places will therefore also be different. Similarly, the difficulties encountered when implementing measures will also differ from place to place. The final aim of a national crime prevention programme is that there should be locally developed crime-prevention programmes (with a national support structure) encompassing: early social prevention, later-stage social prevention, early situational prevention, general situational prevention, and programmes for chronic criminals.

KEY WORDS: crime prevention, evaluation, local crime prevention, neighbourhood prevention policies

The last years of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s was, according to our view, a quite dynamic and promising period in Swedish thinking and policy as regards crime prevention. The ethos in the prime Swedish crime prevention agency BRÅ (the Swedish National Crime Prevention Council) was that crime prevention, by the criminal justice system and others, should be built on knowledge from criminological theory and research and that (only) crime prevention initiatives that were based on such knowledge should be supported and promoted. In other words, crime prevention was viewed as a 'professional' task. It was a time of recognition that to take crime prevention seriously one needed to develop an evidence-based and long-term strategy rather than hoping for any greater and lasting success of poorly grounded 'quick fixes'. The vision was one of ultimately engaging all relevant actors (the family, the school, the health care services, the criminal justice system etcetera) in a co-ordinated effort where the contribution of each should be developed and based on an understanding of their particular role and potential in influencing the general and local social and situational conditions that are conducive to crime. This article is written in that spirit.
The article is a short summary of some of the key elements in a 1996 report to the Swedish Ministry of Justice. The study was commissioned to the authors as a part of the Government's work of creating a National Crime Prevention Programme for Sweden.\(^1\) The full report is published in Swedish (see Wikström and Torstensson 1997). The purpose of the study was to outline the 'best' organisation and direction for developing local crime prevention and its national support. Although the problems dealt with and the suggestion put forward in this article are primarily built on Swedish conditions and experiences, we do believe that it has a more general

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\(^1\) Although including some good points, to our great disappointment the Swedish Government's national programme for crime prevention presented in 1996, called *Our Collective Responsibility* (Ministry of Justice 1997), signifies the beginning of a move towards a more 'unprofessional' approach to crime prevention. This was also followed by a change in the directorship and organisation of the Swedish Crime Prevention Council. Crime prevention and these changes included, in our opinion, a clear degrading of the role of research. In line with that, a decision was taken that the reports from the Council should be no longer than 40 pages and that (with one exception!) no author's name should appear on the reports. More seriously, it has also been decided to scrap the Council's journal *Studies in Crime and Crime Prevention* with its internationally prominent editorial board and high quality papers. In addition to this the only other Swedish institution that worked on crime prevention and policing research, the Research Unit of the Swedish Police College, was closed down. We fear that prevention once again, as was much the case in the 1970s, will become increasingly dominated by slogans, such as that "crime prevention is our collective responsibility", the idea that crime prevention is best served by letting 'thousand flowers bloom' (basically that all crime prevention ideas are equally valid until proven otherwise) and the view that 'locals' know best what to do about their crime problem (a dubious assumption since one would think that if 'locals' really knew what to do they would already have started doing it a long time ago—our experience from working with local communities is rather the reverse). We believe that the view on crime prevention and its organisation presented in the national programme risks resulting in a situation in which the only 'serious' work in crime prevention is likely to be done by the criminal justice system, and as we very well know from research, the criminal justice system's capability to prevent crime by itself is rather limited (see Von Hirsch et al. 1999). We also believe that the ultimate consequence of the 'new' approach to crime prevention is likely to be that people growing up and living in the most disadvantaged conditions (the ones in most need of the development of a well-functioning crime prevention) will continue to be the key sufferers of the consequences of high levels of crime and social disorder. Professional, and well functioning, crime prevention, on the other hand, would have the potential to contribute to a decrease in the social inequality of victimisation that is evident from victimological research. The reasons for why this change in the direction of Swedish crime prevention took place in the late 1990s is out of the scope of this paper, although we believe it would be a worthwhile exercise since it is rather telling of some, probably common, problems in academia and politics facing the development of effective crime prevention.
application. It is all too evident for even the most causal observer of the international literature on crime prevention that the problems and prospects facing crime prevention share many universal characteristics.

**SHORT BACKGROUND AND POINTS OF DEPARTURE**

In February 1993, the Swedish Government instructed the Swedish National Crime Prevention Council (BRÅ) to conduct an analysis of the current situation and future prognoses in the field of crime policy. The findings of the analysis were presented to the Government in November 1993, and the central elements were brought together in a report (see Wikström et al. 1994). The analysis underlined the importance of co-ordinating the crime-prevention efforts of the legal system and other actors. The proposal for a national crime-prevention programme was first put forward in the Crime Prevention Council’s analysis (Wikström et al. 1994). Among the points presented in the report were the following:

- there is no defined ultimate authority in the crime-prevention area;
- there is a need for local crime-prevention programmes to be drawn up and implemented.

A further important foundation for the proposals that we put forward in this article is the experience gained from different research and development projects carried out in Sweden. Many of these were part of what was called the *Government’s pilot projects*. We will be making special use of the lessons learned in the *Karlskoga/Degerfors pilot project*, which suggest how one can create a good organisational basis for local crime-prevention work (see Wikström et al. 1997). It is our belief that the Karlskoga/Degerfors model could provide a basic blueprint for the organisation of local crime-prevention councils.

The *Stockholm Project* (see Wikström 1990) which was conducted in the form of a joint initiative by the Swedish National Crime Prevention Council, the (former) Research Unit of the Swedish National Police College and the University of Stockholm, is probably one of the most extensive studies of crime in cities to have been carried out in Europe. The research carried out for the Stockholm project has provided us with increased knowledge and awareness of patterns of criminality and the local problem profile in urban environments.

The lessons learned from the Stockholm project have furthermore made a valuable contribution to the development of methods for charting local
problem profiles (see Dolmén and Lindström 1991; Wikström 1991; Martens 1992; Lindström 1993; Torstensson 1994a). The questionnaires drawn up as part of the Stockholm project have subsequently been used as a basis for, while at the same time being further developed in, the studies of local problem profiles (and measurements of public safety and security) carried out by the (former) Research Unit of the National Police College on behalf of different police authorities around the country (see e.g. Wikström et al. 1997). All in all the Karlskoga/Degerfors project and the Stockholm project have provided us with important insights into suitable forms of organisation for local crime-prevention work and suitable methodology for studying local problem profiles.

A further important basis on which our proposals are built is our belief that the police are well suited to playing a major role in the development of local-level crime-prevention work. We maintain that the police can best make a contribution to this by means of continuing and intensifying their commitment to developing problem-oriented work methods (see Torstensson 1994b; Torstensson and Wikström 1995b). We also make the premise that community policing, where such initiatives are correctly designed, is an important component of problem-oriented police work since it emphasises the necessity of directing and adapting policing in relation to the conditions prevailing locally.

Problems in Creating Functioning Crime Prevention

Measures taken for the purpose of preventing crime are often characterised by having unclear objectives and insufficient co-ordination with the measures being taken by other actors in the crime-prevention area. It is generally the case that crime-prevention measures are implemented as a result of local initiative, and are carried on over a limited period of time. As a rule projects of this kind are not underpinned by a broadly based crime-prevention strategy, and it is very seldom the case that the measures are subsequently made the object of scientific evaluation. All these factors can be assumed to be important reasons for the fact that many crime-prevention initiatives have, on the whole, had very little success.

The fact that this problem is not confined specifically to the area of crime prevention is illustrated by the following passage, taken from the interim report submitted by the ‘Big Cities Commission’ (a Swedish commission appointed by the Government to survey programmes of measures and other social, educational and labour-market activities which can play a part in promoting positive development in the housing areas of major conurbations):
The trend of development in recent years has been towards what we might somewhat loosely term a 'campaign and aspirin policy', characterised by cosmetic measures and superficial changes in the form of various short-lived project initiatives. [...] As things stand today, numbers of different authorities can instigate projects of limited duration with similar good intentions, projects which run parallel to each other in the same geographical area, without those running the different projects being aware of each other's existence. [...] One general lesson learned from observing these limited projects put in place by different authorities is that while they can achieve a certain amount and are able to put the brakes on negative developments, they are unable to bring about any fundamental change in people's living situation. (Interim report from the Big Cities Commission ('Storstadskommittén'), SOU 1995, p. 7)

What is needed are clearly defined joint objectives to be pursued by all those active in the field of crime prevention; on the basis of such common objectives the actors can build up long-term collaboration and co-ordination in order to enable each participating authority/organisation to make optimal use of its competence and resources in the work of achieving the joint targets.

We maintain that it would be advisable to strive to ensure that resources for crime-prevention work are only allocated to such measures as can be justified on the basis of the clearly defined crime-prevention objectives, where those measures have been formulated on the basis of an understanding of the causes and patterns of crime. In addition, resources should only be allocated to measures where it is intended that there will be a scientific evaluation of the measure or where a scientific evaluation has already been effected and has shown that the measure achieves good results. Research and development (R&D) activities in the area of crime prevention have a key role to play in such a strategy.

*The Core Technology in Crime Prevention*

In the light of what has been said previously, it is our belief, to borrow a phrase from Albert J. Reiss Jr. that R&D should be viewed as the core technology of crime-prevention work. Reiss summarises the problems to be overcome in crime-prevention work in the following manner:

Most interventions to prevent crime are based on untested ideas rather than upon systematic basic or applied science research demonstrating the interventions produce the intended effects and that they are cost-effective. They are rarely conceived and implemented by scientists or specialists in human and organizational engineering. Rather, they are conceived and initiated by administrators and practitioners of private organizations and government agencies who base them on their assumptions about what cause crime, what interventions will affect those causes, and how to organize and implement the intervention. (Reiss 1992, pp. 6–7)
In a situation of the kind described by Reiss two main risks arise. Firstly, there is a risk that considerable resources will be expended on untried measures which may prove to be ineffective and costly, and which may, at worst, lead to a deterioration of the situation. Secondly, there is a risk that a series of untried but promising measures will be introduced in an over-hasty manner without having been sufficiently thought through—the result being that these measures are subsequently erroneously rejected. Reiss maintains that these risks can be reduced by establishing research and development as to what he calls the ‘core technology’ of crime prevention, since R&D provide a foundation on the basis of which it is possible to:

- develop proposals for new measures and make choices between already existing measures;
- gain knowledge about how best to proceed when introducing different kinds of crime-prevention measures;
- evaluate whether the results hoped for have been achieved.

In another context Reiss has made a telling comparison, saying that,

One finds it difficult to imagine that advances in modern medical practise would have been achieved were every local practitioner to have been a problem solver with his or her patients. Nor would the advances in public health have been achieved with a myriad untested programs lacking sound causal inference of how to produce the effects. (Reiss 1995, p. 113)

In an R&D-based model the choice of measures is steered using the currently available knowledge regarding the causes and patterns of crime. Knowledge of this kind is never complete; it can do no more than provide a point of departure for assessing possible measures. The measures adopted must subsequently be put into practice, evaluated, and modified to take account of the lessons learned when using them.

One criticism which is sometimes levelled against the R&D-based model is that it is too slow and therefore often comes into conflict with the demands from political sources to take action (see Moore 1995). It is important to strike a reasonable balance between the demand that measures be rooted in knowledge, and the justifiable wish for measures to be taken swiftly in order to combat problems which are perceived as being serious. It is our belief that the best way to achieve such a balance is by means of organising crime-prevention work in such a way that the measures adopted are required to be firmly based on current ‘science and practical experience’, at the same time as it must be a requirement that the measures
taken are subsequently subject to evaluation. We also believe that it is important in this context that close collaboration be established between researchers and practitioners active in the work of developing and improving crime-prevention measures.

We believe that such an approach represents a diminution of two risks: that measures will be taken which may exacerbate the situation that they are intended to combat; and that untried but promising measures will be implemented in such a way that they end up being erroneously rejected. Such an approach also eliminates the risk of losing the experience and creativity of the practitioner, at the same time as practitioners' proposed measures will be confronted with and gauged against the current knowledge base regarding the causes and patterns of crime. Success in this kind of collaboration could lead to a fruitful symbiosis between researchers and practitioners, which we can assume would provide a boost to development in the field of crime-prevention work.

**The Importance of Crime Prevention Theory**

If crime prevention measures are to be successful they need to be underpinned by a knowledge-based theory regarding the individual and the ecological factors which lead individuals to commit crimes (see e.g. Ekblom 1994; Wikström 1995, 1996). Such a theory makes it possible to understand which social conditions and changes in society can affect crime levels, and suggests on what kind of social conditions crime-prevention initiatives should be focused. A fully developed crime-prevention theory also needs to be based on knowledge and analysis of how different social and situational measures can, in both the short and the long term, influence those factors which induce individuals to commit crime; and the different kinds of organisational and other problems which are associated with the introduction of different types of measures.

An analysis of this kind provides signposts for how measures can best be conceived in order to achieve the maximum effect on the conditions we wish to do something about. One of the central factors inhibiting co-ordination and collaboration between the various actors in the crime-prevention field is the frequent absence of a shared perception of what the causes of the problems are and how they should best be tackled. A crime-prevention theory can play an important role in this respect, by creating a common frame of theoretical reference which establishes the basis for co-ordination and collaboration between the actors in crime-prevention.
The Local Problem Profile

The level and structure of criminality is subject to considerable local variations. What is, and what is perceived as, problematical behaviour differs considerably from region to region, city to city, and areas within a city. It is thus important that crime-prevention work be based on a description of the problem profile prevailing locally. The complex of problems faced in big cities, for example, is very different from the complex of problems existing in a small provincial town, and the strategies guiding the adoption of appropriate measures in these two places will therefore also be different. Similarly, the difficulties encountered when implementing measures will also differ from place to place. We maintain that it is of the utmost importance that local crime-prevention work be firmly based on a properly executed survey of the local problem profile. A survey of this kind represents an important point of departure, providing the various actors engaged in crime-prevention work with a common description of the problems to be tackled, thus enabling them to co-ordinate initiatives and measures.

Conclusions

In the light of the above we maintain that qualified research and development should be made the cornerstone of national and local crime-prevention work; this R&D should be directed towards further developing crime-prevention theory and descriptions of local problem profiles. This will then make it possible to draw up proposals for programmes of measures which take full account of local conditions. The proposed measures should be conceived as the result of joint initiatives between researchers and practitioners. Finally, there should be a structure of co-ordination and collaboration between different local authorities and organisations, based on crime-prevention theory and a description of the local problem profile. This will provide a foundation on which a local crime-prevention strategy can be drawn up and which can be used to co-ordinate and justify the measures taken by different actors.

Organisation and Direction of Local Crime Prevention

On the whole society's efforts to reduce criminality and increase community safety can be said hitherto to have been somewhat unsuccessful. We believe that the principal reason for this lack of success has been the fact that to date, crime-prevention work has been carried out without a clear sense of direction and focus backed by expert knowledge and long-term thinking;
and without a carefully constructed strategy and organisation enmeshing both the national and the local level. The objective of a national crime-prevention programme ought, then, to be to put these shortcomings right, by drawing up a national strategy and organisation for development work in the area of crime prevention; this work should have a solid foundation in expert knowledge, encompass the long-term view, and be applicable both nationally and locally.

We believe that this can best be achieved by means of building up a strong national R&D base to support local crime-prevention work, at the same time as the local crime-prevention initiatives are given structural organisation in the form of local crime-prevention councils, the task of which is to establish, and continually update local crime-prevention strategies based on an agreed understanding of what crime prevention is and what the specific problems faced locally are.

**National Research and Development Support**

We argue that, a national institution providing research-and-development support to local crime-prevention work should be established. The institution’s task should be to promote the creation and development of local crime-prevention councils/local crime-prevention initiatives, by means of R&D work and by providing training in the area of crime prevention. The institution should have as a special remit:

1. To be a forum for national co-ordination between the police, the provincial authorities, and the municipal authorities with regard to the work of building up and developing local crime-prevention work.
2. To work in tandem with and support the efforts of local police authorities, and provincial and municipal authorities, in the development of their local crime-prevention work.
3. To conduct research into, and work on the development of, the establishment of local programmes of crime-prevention measures.
4. To distribute funds to, help with the planning of, and assess the efficacy of, local development-projects in the area of crime prevention.
5. To conduct a national, and separate local, survey investigations with the aim of charting criminality, people’s sense of community safety, and the development of local crime-prevention work.
6. To conduct crime-prevention training for regional and local authorities and organisations involved in crime-prevention work.
7. To participate in and contribute to the development of international R&D work in the area of crime prevention.
Local Crime-Prevention Councils

There seems to be a high degree of agreement that the establishment of local crime-prevention councils is the right way forward for crime-prevention work. Another frequently reiterated viewpoint is the worthiness of strengthening and extending the collaboration and co-ordination between the local actors involved in crime prevention. In a number of places in Sweden local crime-prevention councils have been founded; these vary considerably as to their structure and ambition (as emerged from a survey of existing local crime prevention councils that we conducted in Sweden in January 1996). Only a small number of them have access to qualified R&D guidance and support in developing their local crime-prevention work.

We argue that local crime-prevention councils should be set up (where such do not exist). Each council should consist of the main local political decision-makers and the managers of those local authorities and administrative functions that are central actors in the area of crime prevention (the police, the social services, schools, the Recreational Activities Administration, and the health-care/hospital services). The local crime-prevention council should be required to draw up a local crime-prevention strategy to embrace:

1. agreement as to which are the most important factors influencing criminality;
2. a description, agreed by all parties, of the specific problems faced locally;
3. a plan for the allocation of work to and the collaboration and co-ordination between the various actors making up the local crime-prevention council;
4. a plan for developing contacts and collaboration with, and for activating, the family and local private enterprise in local crime-prevention work;
5. a programme of social and situational measures directed at different problem milieus and different categories of offender.

The final aim is that there should be local crime-prevention programmes encompassing: early social prevention; later-stage social prevention; early situational prevention; general situational prevention; programmes for chronic criminals.

The responsibility for drawing up a local crime-prevention strategy should rest on a crime-prevention committee, to be appointed by the local crime-prevention council. The aim should be that the committee consists of se-
lected functionaries having a strong position in the various authorities and administrative organisations making up the office.

The crime-prevention committee should be provided with active, qualified R&D support in its development of crime-prevention initiatives. The local crime-prevention council should endeavour to take jointly reached decisions, to be binding on all actors, on crime-prevention programmes and measures based on the proposals issuing from the crime-prevention committee.

The Role of the Police

The police force has a central role to play in the development of local crime-prevention work, and in many places around the country the police is a driving force in this field. This role appears to be a natural one, since the police force is the only one of the actors in crime prevention to have criminality as its main sphere of activity. That being said, the police's ability to influence criminality without assistance from other quarters is limited. We would maintain that the police ought to concentrate its crime-prevention efforts on the following main areas:

- the development and strengthening of situational crime-prevention measures, proceeding from a problem-oriented approach;
- efforts to activate and work together with (within the framework of the local crime-prevention council) the other actors in the area of crime prevention who can be of help in situational crime prevention and affect circumstances and conditions of importance in social prevention.

Bearing in mind the police force's field of work and competence we do not feel that the police should expend effort on direct measures in the area of social prevention; attention should instead be directed on measures that can provide those actors best suited to working in this area with support. If the police force is to succeed in its ambition to develop and intensify its use of a problem-oriented approach to its work and of community policing, then we think it is of the utmost importance that it be ensured access to and back-up from qualified R&D activity.

LOCAL DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES

Objectives for Local Development Initiatives

We would maintain that the ultimate objective for local development initiatives should be to work out effective measures in the area of crime prevention which on a general basis can be integrated into the regular
activity of the actors that the respective development initiative involves. This should be achieved in accordance with the following model.

1. A measure, or programme of measures, is worked out, building on the knowledge and expertise available on the patterns and causes of criminality, and also taking into account any evaluations of this measure that have been carried out. The chief responsibility for formulating measures and programmes of measures should rest with the institution for national R&D support.

2. The measure/programme should be implemented on a trial basis, and subsequently evaluated, in one or more local development initiatives. These initiatives should be framed in such a way that the local crime-prevention council signs a contract with the institution for national R&D support: the former undertakes therein to implement the measure, and the latter undertakes to provide R&D support with regard to planning and structuring, and evaluating, the initiative, and to provide funding for the additional costs arising from the trial aspect of the initiative. A basic principle ought to be, however, that the major part of the cost of the actual measure/programme itself be accommodated within the framework of the regular budget of the participating actors.

3. The findings of the evaluation of the local development initiatives should then provide the basis for a decision as to whether the measure/programme is to be introduced across the country as part of the regular work of the actors that the initiative involves. This nation-wide implementation can be achieved by means such as legislation, decisions of municipal authorities, or specific provisions/recommendations from central state authorities.

An Integrated Local Strategy

Figure 1 shows the five actors in the field of crime prevention which, in our opinion, should constitute the local crime-prevention council: the police, the social services, schools, the Recreational Activities Administration, and the health-care services. In addition to these, the figure shows the other two actors (the family and the private enterprises) which we consider that a local crime-prevention council should endeavour to influence and work together with in its crime-prevention work. The double-ended arrows indicate between which actors we consider that close collaboration ought to be developed. This collaboration should be directed towards the establishment of local crime-prevention programmes in the following main areas:
1. early social prevention (during pregnancy and pre-school age);
2. later-stage social prevention (school-children in the 7–11 year-old age-range)
3. early situational prevention (school-children in the 12–15 year-old age-range);
4. general situational prevention (all ages);
5. programmes for chronic criminals.

The numbering of the arrows in Figure 1 refers to which of the crime prevention areas the respective collaborative efforts are aimed at countering.

Social Prevention

Social prevention should be focused on measures which influence the environment in which children grow up and which are of importance for their personality development and social integration into conventional society. If successful results are to be achieved in the area of social prevention, then it is necessary to develop strategies for influencing and working together with families. Measures taken in the area of social prevention should primarily be concentrated on risk families and risk environments, and espe-
cially where the two combine and multiply the risk factor. Successful social prevention should (in the long term) lead to a reduction in the number of individuals recruited to the category of chronic criminals.

*Early social prevention* (during pregnancy and pre-school age) should be built up around collaboration and co-ordination between the social services and the health-care services, and ought primarily to focus on measures which are targeted on children’s formative environment and take effect in areas of relevance for the development of future criminal propensities.

*Later-stage social prevention* (school children in the 7–11 year-old age-range) should focus on schools, and be built up around collaboration and co-ordination between schools and the social services. Its prime aim should be to foster children’s social integration into conventional society.

**Situational Prevention**

Situational crime prevention should focus on measures which contribute to producing a reduction in sources of temptation and friction, and which emphasise and point up the tangibility of the threat of punishment. Measures taken in the area of situational prevention should above all be concentrated on hot spots (that is, points of problem confluence) which have been identified during the charting of the specific problems faced locally. Successful situational prevention should (in the short term) lead to a reduction in the number of occasional crimes committed. In addition, measures taken in the area of early situational prevention can (in the long term) make an important contribution to the work that aims at reducing recruitment to the category of chronic criminals.

*Early situational prevention* (school children in the 12–15 year-old age-range) should be built up around, and involve close collaboration between, schools and the local Recreational Activities Administration. It is also important that early situational prevention address itself to the family. Moreover, we believe that the establishment of a young people’s panel (for ages 12–15) can make a valuable contribution to the work of early situational prevention, and also be of worth in the work of social crime prevention.

*General situational prevention* (all ages) should have the police as its core, and be built up around collaboration between the police and private enterprise (with other actors naturally also being able to play an important part). The police force does not only have a central role to play in situational prevention; it can also be the source of considerable back-up and support for the other actors involved in social prevention.
Finally, programmes for chronic criminals should be built up around collaboration and co-ordination between the police, the social services, and the health-care and hospital services. These programmes will naturally include collaboration with the prison/correctional care service.

There follows below a description of examples of specific projects within the five programme-areas which we believe have some support in criminological theory and research and are well suited to being run as development projects within the framework of local crime-prevention councils.

PROGRAMMES IN THE AREA OF SOCIAL AND SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION

Early Social Prevention

A programme for early social prevention should include the instruction to the health-care and hospital services and the social services to work out jointly a local strategy which should embrace:

1. General information and guidance to parents-to-be and new parents within the framework of the pre-natal and infant care services.
2. A strategy for trouble spotting directed towards children in risk families and risk housing areas. This kind of strategy could, for example, include elements such as:
   - charting of risk families and risk milieus in the locality;
   - frequent visits to the homes of risk families, combined with programmes of intensive information and guidance for parents.
3. An integrated strategy for identifying and helping children who have a rough home background. This kind of strategy could, for example, include elements such as:
   - the development of systems for identifying children at risk. Staff of the pre-natal and infant care services, and of day crèches and preschools should be given special training enabling them to identify when children are at risk and informing them as to who they should report to when there are suspicions that children are being badly treated at home;
   - the establishment of a special authority within the social services specialised in assessing information relating to children at risk, and charged with ensuring that, wherever necessary, the appropriate steps are taken;
   - the development of tailored support and help programmes for children and parents based on their specific problems; these programmes
should be developed jointly by the social services and the health-care and hospital services (child, adolescent and adult psychiatry).

4. Special educational work with children who show a low level of impulse-control and a high level of aggression.

5. Special programmes, organised within the framework of day-crèche and pre-school structures, preparing children with special needs for school life.

Later-Stage Social Prevention

A programme for later-stage social prevention should include the instruction to the school authorities (in particular for grades one to six) to work out on their own account, and in certain respects conjointly with the social services, a strategy for local schools which should embrace:

1. A plan for strengthening the role of schools in social education/training. This kind of plan could, for example, include elements such as:
   - ensuring that teachers are clearly reminded of the importance of school for social education/training, and of how important it is that this aspect finds a place in their work;
   - clear, unambiguous rules for behaviour, measures to ensure that the rules are adhered to, and the application of penalties in cases of non-observance of the rules;
   - special training for teachers of 7–12 year-olds in the areas mentioned in the points below;
   - a thorough anti-bullying programme;
   - a thorough anti-truancy programme.

2. A plan for improving the involvement of parents in the schools' role as provider of social education/training. This kind of plan could, for example, include elements such as:
   - weekly reports to parents on children’s discipline and behaviour, with teachers contacting parents directly whenever problems of any seriousness arise;
   - the right and duty for parents to visit the school (with compensation for loss of income from work being paid) if their children are having problems;
   - termly meetings between teachers, children and parents to discuss the child’s social development.

3. A plan for building up close collaboration between schools and the social services with regard to children with special problems. This kind of plan could, for example, include elements such as:
establishing firm contact channels between schools and the social services;
- developing special support and assistance measures for children with social or psychological problems, or whose parents have such problems.

**Early Situational Prevention**

A programme for early situational crime prevention should include the instruction to the school authorities and the Recreational Activities Administration (or corresponding authority) to work out, both on their own separate accounts and conjointly, a local strategy for 12–15 year-olds which should embrace the following elements.

1. A plan for how to organise adult supervision of pupils during break-times and free lessons.
2. A plan for how after-school/recreational activities can best be coordinated with schools' morning and afternoon activities.
3. A plan regarding which recreational activities are to be encouraged and promoted. A plan of this kind could, for example, include elements such as:
   - choice and shaping of recreational activities so that they contribute to fostering children's integration into 'conventional' society;
   - avoiding organising recreational activities at times, and in places and environments, which might entail social risks.
4. A plan for identifying and taking steps to counteract criminal youth gangs. A plan of this kind could, for example, include elements such as:
   - methods for facilitating the identification, within the framework provided by schools and the Recreational Activities Administration, of groups of young people who risk being drawn into full criminality;
   - the establishment, through the joint efforts of the police and the social services, of a special youth bureau, to which such information can be given; -using this youth bureau to co-ordinate the efforts of the police and the social services in the work of reaching, influencing and dissolving youth gangs with criminal tendencies.

A programme for early situational prevention should in addition also include the instruction to the local crime-prevention council.

5. Work to establish a special local young people's panel for youngsters aged 12–15; this panel, whose proceedings are to be held in the form of
hearings, is to investigate, decide on and implement measures in reaction to the committal of repeated or serious criminal acts.

6. Conduct an annual, targeted information campaign aimed at the parents of teenagers, detailing for them what the crime problems faced locally are, and highlighting how important it is for them to have rules for, and a good awareness of, what their children do, and when, in their free time.

The latter two measures are aimed at mobilising the family in crime-prevention work and reinforcing the idea of sanctions being applied to teenage youngsters if offences are committed. The sanctions which come into consideration within the framework of a young people’s panel are mutual agreements between the child and key persons in the child’s life (parents, teachers, recreation leaders, after-school centre staff, etcetera) on what behaviour/activities are to be allowed and, if this does not produce the desired result, the imposition of intensive supervision; should this not be successful either, the ultimate sanction would be to hand the child’s case over to community care.

General Situational Prevention

A programme for general situational crime prevention should be developed by means of the police being instructed, both on their own account and conjointly with local private enterprise, to draw up a local strategy which should embrace:

1. A plan for measures specifically designed to prevent crimes and disturbances of the peace being committed, and to increase community safety in the centre of larger towns. A plan of this kind could, for example, include elements such as:
   - concentrated, visible community policing at times and in places where problems are most serious, organised on the basis provided by a detailed survey of the specific problems faced locally;
   - a lowering of the tolerance threshold for what kinds of behaviour are acceptable in public places;
   - introduction of day-time ‘City Watch’, along the lines of the system operating in the Netherlands;
   - installation of a system of surveillance cameras to be operated in the late evening and night-time;
   - development of co-ordination and collaboration with restaurants and pubs on questions relating to public order.
2. A special plan for major community policing efforts in 'multi-problem housing areas'. A plan of this kind could, for example, include elements such as:
- concentrated, visible community policing at times and in places where problems are most serious, organised on the basis provided by a detailed survey of the specific problems faced locally;
- a detailed charting of the problems faced on the housing estate;
- high police density at times and in places where problems are most concentrated;
- efforts to activate residents to participate in crime-prevention work; residents to be provided with information on the problems faced by the estate and on possible measures to improve the situation;
- development of close co-operation with landlords in the field of crime prevention.

3. A plan for reinforcing the perceived threat of punishment for minor criminal acts by means of introducing a system of 'random crime enquiries' (e.g. as regards thefts of bikes in schools).

4. A plan for directing special efforts on the area of 'repeated victimisation' along the lines of the 'Huddersfield Model'.

5. A plan for measures to be taken in the situations of intra-family violence encountered by the police adjusted to residential areas of different socio-economic characteristics.

6. A plan for developing the provision of police support to the other actors in the area of crime prevention. Support of this kind could, for example, include elements such as special police presence in schools with serious problems.

7. The establishment of a special local co-ordination body linking police, shops and industry in the effort to develop situational crime prevention in these kind of businesses/premises. Co-ordination and collaboration of this kind could, for example, include elements such as:
- special crime-prevention plans for big shopping centres;
- special crime-prevention plans for industrial estates.

**Special Programmes for Chronic Criminals**

A special programme for confirmed criminals should be developed by means of the police, the social services, and the health-care and hospital services being instructed conjointly, in association with the prison/correctional care services, to draw up a local strategy which should embrace the establishment of a special Chronic Criminals Office, to be composed of officials from
the police force, the social services, the health-care and hospital services and the prison/correctional care services; this office should be charged with tasks such as:

- producing and maintaining dossiers on known local chronic criminals and their individual problem configurations;
- organising the exchange of information and co-ordinating the efforts of those working in the field, in order to increase the effectiveness of measures and campaigns undertaken to counter the criminality of chronic criminals.

CONCLUSION

The ideas regarding the organisation of local crime prevention and its national support that we have outlined in this article obviously have a somewhat preliminary character (for one thing, we have not considered at all the role of voluntary organisations that in many countries plays a significant role in crime prevention). We are also very well aware that many of the single measures mentioned are already up and running in many places. However, we doubt very much that there really exist any truly comprehensive and integrative attempts to build local crime prevention with a developed national support, and we think that it is in such a development that crime prevention has a promising future.

REFERENCES


SELECTED REFERENCES

(relating specifically to the section on the five preventive programs)


ABSTRACT. Many neighbourhoods in the Netherlands have reached the stage of colliding subcultures, and interpersonal conflict. The young live next to the old, the rich next to the poor, single people next to families, the white next to the brown and the black, the established next to the outsiders. In some places, this social-cultural abundance leads to fear, uncertainty, and irritation. Not everybody is as understanding and tolerant of diverse lifestyles and thinking patterns as another person is. In places, this diversity leads to new behaviour patterns and institutions. Multi-ethnic community boards are starting to function as mediatory panels for settling disputes between neighbours and neighbourhood residents. In this article we claim that community mediation—a form of alternative dispute resolution designed to resolve interpersonal conflict in the neighbourhood—is both an attempt to rejuvenate the idea of community and a new way to settle differences and interpersonal conflicts between neighbours in the Netherlands. One might even argue that the neighbourhood is a level too high for social intervention and that instead one should focus on a lower level in the lifeworld: the house, the block, or at most, the street.

KEY WORDS: autonomisation, community mediation, neighbourhood, social policy

Modern society can be characterised by the process of formalising social relations. Over the years, conflicts are being increasingly defined and processed within the domain of the legal system. Conflict solving mechanisms have become monopolised by the formal institutions of social justice. Other traditional institutions that (used to) solve conflicts, e.g. the Church, the family, the community, have become less prominent conflict solvers. It is not surprising in this respect, that mediation—an anthropologically and historically non-legal way of settling disputes—originates in many modern states from the legal system. From a historical perspective, this is the world upside down. The trend of mediation has even been presented as a way of relieving case-pressure on courts.
In this article, we will discuss recent experiments with community mediation in the Netherlands. Community mediation is a form of mediation designed especially for neighbours (and other community members) to resolve their mutual conflicts outside the legal system and inside the local community. Neighbour conflicts involve ongoing struggles stretching over a long period of time. They typically begin with a lifestyle difference, often merge with class and/or race differences, and escalate over time through a series of acts of nuisance and mutual retaliation. In the early 1970s, the idea of community mediation was given shape by the founding of the San Francisco Community Boards (SFCB). The founders of the SFCB emerged from a tradition of community organizing. They hoped to establish a separate justice system to the state system that would be more responsive to local community needs and interests (Merry 1997).

First, we will examine the basic principles and ideas of community mediation. Next, we will describe the background, the practical set-up and the results of the experiments in the Netherlands. After the description of community mediation in practice, we argue that a need orientation is an important criterion for evaluating the results of community mediation, understood as a project by and for citizens (qua selection of cases, tasks of community board members, privacy-rules, etcetera). We will introduce the concept of autonomisation to describe a general process in which (groups of) citizens reclaim the conflict solving action space, which has become institutionalised in modern society within the legal system. If the concept of autonomisation can be empirically grounded in future research, the process that it entails may well offer important possibilities for institutional fine-tuning in the legal system and the community at large.

THE IDEA OF COMMUNITY MEDIATION

Community mediation is focused on resolving interpersonal conflict between neighbours, often involving colliding lifestyles and beliefs, such as different types of cultural expectations and behaviour patterns in the community, stereotyping and prejudice. Community mediation takes place in the

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1John Blad has reported earlier on the experiments in Netherlands in this journal (Blad 1996).

2This is not so much a conflict of interest, or a value conflict, but a conflict about not fulfilling lifeworld (silent and daily) expectations, e.g. a lifestyle conflict. See also Aubert's distinction between types of conflict (Aubert 1963).
lifeworld of people: the neighbourhood. Community mediation consists of two terms, which are equally important: community and mediation. First we will discuss the mediation element; after that we will pay attention to the community element.

Community Mediation as Alternative Dispute Resolution

Neighbourhood disputes have become qualified as ‘home-garden-and-kitchen’ conflicts, referring to the daily character and relatively small scope of many of these conflicts. In court, these cases are referred to as ‘garbage cases’, implying that they are hard to solve or settle, involve minor financial stakes, etcetera (Merry 1997). The observation that these so-called ‘lifeworld conflicts’ are not minor conflicts is, however, important. Seen from a socio-psychological perspective, people experience neighbour(hood) conflicts as unpredictable, penetrating and often intolerable. A person cannot defend himself or herself against this type of nuisance. Neighbour problems are, from the nature of things, close to the senses. Sounds, smells, pets and insults coming from a neighbour can intrude physically on a person’s sense of privacy and safety. These intrusions are hard to ignore. Most neighbours, on their own accord, seem unsuccessful in making problems go away. They could move, but cannot financially or do not want to (Spierings 1998b). One should be warned that these conflicts could seriously damage the living climate of a community.

In the early 1970s, the idea of community mediation was given shape by the founding of the San Francisco Community Boards (SFCB) in the United States (Merry and Milner 1993). Central in the SFCB model is the ‘dispute resolution panel’. The San Francisco panels consist of three to five trained individuals, volunteers living in the same community as the disputing parties. They organise meetings with disputants, referred to as the complainant and the respondent. The volunteers in the panel have no contractual, legal or formal power or authority over the disputants or the dispute. Participation in a ‘hearing’ is voluntary for all parties.

The main aim of the dispute resolution panel is to bring people together, and to try to conciliate and reconcile differences between people. The disputing parties are stimulated to communicate their differences openly,

3 We understand the concept of the lifeworld in accordance with the work of Alfred Schutz (Schutz 1967).

4 Furthermore, nobody knows when the conflict will be solved. This leads to an uncertainty that can have a tremendous effect on the psychological well being of people (cf. Erikson 1995).
not only at the interest level, but also on the emotional and expressive level ordinarily associated with interpersonal conflict. The expression of emotions is important in order to achieve agreement in the end. Hostilities between parties, often arising from differences in interpretations of events, have to be discussed openly as a way of grounding the dispute-settlement process in the emotional needs of the disputants. The idea behind this is, that if the emotions and interests of disputants can be both addressed and reasonably satisfied, then the non-legal agreement or contract will hold up without force of law or formal authority (Shonholtz 1993).

Community mediation is not only concerned with solving problems, but also with re-establishing durable relationships between neighbours. People are asked to participate actively. The participants themselves have to look for solutions. Nobody gives a verdict; no external authority chooses a solution. This form of participation can lead to 'empowerment' — the idea that people feel that their actions 'make a difference' — not only for the conflicting parties involved but also for the volunteers that help to settle the dispute (Baruch Bush and Folger 1994). The process of community mediation can be broken down into several phases.

— **Orientation:** the mediator collects the facts about the conflict. He also gives both parties the opportunity to talk about their emotions. Hereafter, the mediator tries to make up the balance.

— **Understanding:** the mediator tries to start the communication between the conflicting parties. The goal is reaching common understanding.

— **Comprehension:** after understanding, a new perspective on the other party might be possible.

— **Negotiating solutions:** both parties try to look for solutions, and these will be set out in a sort of contract, or written agreement.

— **Evaluation.**

Raymond Shonholtz, founder of the SFCB, hoped to establish an alternative justice system in the community — separate from the state system — which would be more responsive to local community needs and interests. He came out of a tradition of community organising (Merry and Milner 1993). The early SFCB used anti-law rhetoric. The law was perceived as alienating and remote, a place where average people received poor services and their problems were not taken seriously.

Sally Engle Merry, who studied the SFCB intensively, concludes that mediation can be effective in conflicts between neighbours. When both sides become weary of the conflict and seek only to find a space where they are equal, mediation can provide an opportunity to declare a stopping point.
Merry maintains that mediation is far less effective in producing a just settlement when the parties are unequal, for instance employer-employee, landlord-tenant, domestic violence between parents and children, man and wife. The basic problem with conflicts between unequals is that mediation is a system of trading concessions. In order to reach an agreement, mediators have to build on the concessions that the weaker party is willing to make. As a result, many respondents are reluctant to use mediation (Merry 1997). Importantly, inequality can also arise when a neighbourhood changes, new neighbours settle, former neighbours depart, and life style differences begin to merge with age, class, race and even sex differences (Elias and Scotson 1965; Lofland 1989).

Community Mediation as Part Community Building

When a neighbourhood changes through gentrification, urban renewal, or urban degeneration, neighbours are challenged to find a new way of living together. In the 1980s, many neighbourhoods in the Dutch cities experienced problems of some kind with the relocation of residents. Old norms, mutual expectations and even minority rules were challenged by newcomers in the neighbourhood who did not comply to the cultural expectations of the ‘old guard’. Coping strategies and identities, originally designed to create a bearable social climate, changed. Some old residents actively put pressure on the new, in order to make them behave in a ‘socially’ acceptable manner. In some places, this led to resentment. Residents started to avoid each other.

As a response, community mediation was introduced by local and central authorities as an instrument to re-establish a sense of community. Community mediation was part of a comprehensive programme of social renewal. It was seen as an instrument to improve community safety and quality of life in the cities. After improving the houses, governments invested in bringing the social network of the neighbourhood closer to the people. Cities tried to actively involve residents in community activities (like cleaning the street together, organising a neighbourhood party, etcetera). Housing corporations were given a task in upgrading the social climate.⁵ Social services were couched in the language of community building, community policing became apparent and Justice Centres were initiated in the neighbourhood, situated close to and for the people (Boutellier 1996). This happened not, as in the United States out of a sense of community organising,

⁵Since the mid-1990s housing associations are required to take care of the quality of life. This is considered to be a regular part of their work.
but out of a sense of rebuilding social ties. All these parties were also initially involved in the implementation of the idea of community mediation.

**Experiments with Community Mediation in the Netherlands**

In 1996–1997 three experimental projects were initiated in the Netherlands, aimed at conflict mediation at the local community level; one situated in Rotterdam (1996), one in Zwolle (1996), and one in Gouda (1997). The project in Rotterdam (the second city of the Netherlands, ± 600,000 inhabitants) concerns a comparative experiment in three distinctly different neighbourhoods. These neighbourhoods can be classified as an urban renewal area, a zone of transition and an area of cheap housing in high rise buildings. The quality of life in these areas is judged by the residents as fairly poor. Zwolle is a city with a population of 100,000 in the eastern part of the Netherlands. The quality of life in Zwolle is judged as fairly good. Gouda — like Zwolle — is a middle-sized city, right on the edge of the Randstad (the western, densely populated part of the Netherlands). The quality of life is judged as average. For instance, many autochthonous residents claim there is a problem with the Moroccan ethnic community in Gouda.

The Ministry of Justice and the local council finances the projects in Zwolle and Gouda. In Rotterdam the local council, the community council and two housing associations finance the projects. On the ideological level the San Francisco Community Boards have inspired all projects. The idea of reinforcing the community is only implemented in Rotterdam. In Zwolle and Gouda they are mostly interested in resolving the conflicts. Community building is considered to be an unattainable goal.

**Initiating the Project**

Starting an experiment such as community mediation takes quite some time before it is up and working. In Zwolle the mediation project started in the autumn of 1996, whilst in Rotterdam mediation started in the spring of 1997 for the first neighbourhood (Lombardijen), in the summer of 1997

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A fourth project was initiated in Gorinchem (33,000 inhabitants) at the end of 1997. This project is not discussed in this article.
for the second neighbourhood (Schiemond), and more recently (January 1998) mediation has started in the third neighbourhood (Nieuwe Westen). In Gouda the mediation project started in the autumn of 1997. In all the locations a professional was hired to help start up local projects. In Zwolle and Gouda this professional is affiliated with the local social service institution, and this professional input is meant to be longlasting. In Rotterdam, it was hoped that volunteers would take over the role of the professional, but at present a facilitating professional institution is still necessary. In all the locations, thought is being given to the issue of excessive personalisation of the role of the professional.

Training

In Rotterdam, Zwolle, and Gouda volunteers perform the actual mediations. The volunteers are recruited from within the three neighbourhoods in Rotterdam, and from all over the city in Zwolle and Gouda. Volunteers only operate in their community. Not every citizen is suited to become a community mediator. Before one becomes a mediator, training by a professional mediator is required. The mediators-to-be are trained in communication skills. The most important part of the training is to develop the skill of dealing with communication barriers such as blaming and claiming reparation or restitution. The mediators are trained in active listening, to ask questions, and to reformulate the stories of the conflicting parties in a positive way.

A difficult aspect of the training is the position of the mediator in the conflict. The mediator plays a specific role in the mediation process. He or she is not allowed to actively participate in bringing up solutions. Also, a mediator is not allowed to direct the conflicting parties to a personal solution to the conflict. The mediator accepts the constructions of the reality for both the conflicting parties. He or she will try to support their emotions, while trying to uncover their wishes and interests. Most importantly, the mediator will not discuss the emotions, wishes or interests of the conflicting parties. The main purpose is to facilitate both parties in resolving their differences, by listening to the arguments, asking questions, and reformulating the stories. In some cases this can lead, as Merry indicated, to a tendency to bypass non-negotiable issues and taboos, such as violence in a relationship. Some topics cannot be discussed (Merry 1997). The role of the mediator in community mediation is therefore different from the role that mediators play in conciliation or arbitrage. The mediator in community mediation can be regarded as a facilitator or a panel chairman. In practice it took quite some time to teach the
volunteers not to be directive in the mediation process. It is a natural habit of people to think up solutions when people present their problems.

A big challenge for community mediation has been the attempt to be successful in finding a representative community board in each neighbourhood. Critics doubted whether it was possible to find enough ethnic participation in the boards. In other resident-projects such as voluntary work, resident-boards, victim help, etcetera, this had previously been impossible. Critics were proven wrong in connection with community mediation, however. Through extensive communication, approaching self-help organisations, visiting schools, and meeting places, ethnic representation in the boards succeeded. Spokesmen of ethnic communities were approached and involved in recruiting members. In the end, each community board in Rotterdam had several ethnic members. Not only are most ethnic groups 'represented', the projects also succeeded in interesting young and elderly people, and men and women in equal numbers. The community boards became broadly representative of the communities they were functioning in. But in Zwolle and Gouda they did not succeed in getting a representation of the city. This was partly due to the fact that the potential pool of mediators-to-be was much larger.

Two Models of Community Mediation

Although the experiments in community mediation in the Netherlands have all been inspired by the SFCBs, the implementation process has taken on different forms. Over the space of two years, two models have developed: a neighbourhood model, and a city model.8

The experiment in Rotterdam is most similar to the SFCB, even on the conceptual level. The ‘boards’ in Rotterdam are independent groups of volunteers, who are not directly associated with existing institutions in the community. The boards slowly broaden their working area, geographically, and with respect to their field of expertise (more different types of cases).

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7We can distinguish between evaluative and facilitative mediation. When mediation is evaluative the mediator actively introduces a third party view to assist in settling the dispute. The facilitative mediation implies no third party view, the mediator only facilitates the possibility for two parties to settle their dispute (Mackie et al. 1995). The latter is the case for community mediation.

8Gorinchem can be referred to as a 'professional model'. In Gorinchem there is a professional mediator, and a contact officer working for the police department. Contact officers working for the housing associations redirect all the cases.
Rotterdam is referred to as the neighbourhood model. Community mediation experiments in Zwolle and Gouda are instead situated within the local social services foundations. The community mediators are recruited and operate on a citywide scale. Zwolle and Gouda represent the city model.

An important difference between the models is the scale of the pool from which cases are selected and the identification with a locality connected with it. The community board in the neighbourhood model only mediates in local cases; the neighbourhoods are approximately 4,000 residents large. Local volunteers are mediating in conflicts between a local complainant (the first party) and a local respondent (the second party). The co-ordinator and the central co-ordinator of the neighbourhood model operate independently; they are not affiliated with an organisation or institution. Each of them has an independent agency. The community board in the neighbourhood model decides on the operational questions, for instance which cases to mediate and which not, how to operate with regard to privacy rules, when to meet, etcetera. The co-ordinator of the city model is on the pay-roll of the social services bureau in the city concerned. The co-ordinator distributes the cases, organises meetings, intake procedures, after care procedures, etcetera. Where the sense of community is strong in the neighbourhood model, it plays no significant role in the city model.

Another difference is the degree of distance to professional workers in the field, the housing corporation, the police department, community workers. The community board in the neighbourhood model has only a short distance to go to reach professionals in the field. It is easier to run into one another and to discuss situations informally than it is in the city model.

On the other hand, selection of volunteers in the enrolment process in the city model is city wide, which provides for a bigger reservoir of volunteers. It appears that the level of education and income is somewhat higher than might be suspected from population statistics. This may seem advantageous, but in practice a higher level of education does not seem to be important with connection to mediations, whereas good social skills are. Also, in the city model it is more difficult to get a board of volunteers that is representative for the community. In Table I we present an overview of the two models. The two models are largely similar. This is not surprising, considering the mutual source of inspiration.
COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN PRACTICE

In this section we will present the results of the experiments in Rotterdam, Zwolle, and Gouda. As mentioned above, not all the experiments started at the same time. In every city it took some time before the community mediators could start. The groundwork for training, information, networking, and finding cases in the community had to be done, and the boards had to decide on intake procedures, privacy rules, registration, etcetera.

Registration and Nature of Complaints

During the research period 159 cases were registered in Zwolle, 109 in Gouda, and 94 in Rotterdam (in the three neighbourhoods together). We have chosen not to discuss the results of each separate city or neighbourhood, but instead to use the two models of community mediation. Thus, in the city model there were 268 cases registered, and in the neighbourhood model 94 cases. Since the start there has been a steady increase in cases. This is mostly due to the continuous increase in registration at the city model, though the neighbourhood model shows a more irregular pattern.

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9Our material is collected in two ways. We used the unstandardised registrations and notes of the project-managers in the three cities. We discussed all case material intensively. We also used standardised registration forms, which were developed by our team of researchers in co-operation with the project-managers. Unfortunately, these standardised forms were not systematically filled in.

10In the recent research report Bemiddelen bij conflicten tussen buren (Peper et al. 1999) we describe each location in more detail.
TABLE II

Registration of complaints (in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>City model (n = 268)</th>
<th>Neighbourhood model (n = 94)</th>
<th>Total (n = 362)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-registration*</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing associations</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*A part of the self-registrations are those people who are told by other institutions to voice a complaint about the neighbours to the community boards.

At the start of the experiments, institutions such as the police, housing associations, and social workers, were asked to co-operate by directing suitable cases towards community mediation. During the start-up period, residents needed to become aware that a new platform for settling disputes was being set up in the community. Therefore, an important question is: who is making reference to the community mediation projects?

In spite of the fact that community mediation was a new phenomenon, more than one third of the registrations came from the complainants themselves. It is not strange that the housing associations in Rotterdam directed a lot of cases, they were strongly involved in the project. One of the associations in Rotterdam actually initiated the project in the early 1990s. The amount of cases directed by the police in Rotterdam is, however, remarkably low. This is due to the fact that a lot of ‘minor irritations’ between neighbours disappear against the background of other social problems in a city like Rotterdam. This is less so in the cases of Zwolle and Gouda.

What are the problems people complain about? In Table III an overview is presented. In some instances more than one complaint was given. These complaints were registered as multiple problems. In the other instances the first (and dominant) complaint was registered.

Table III also shows the distribution of complaints in the Netherlands compared to the San Francisco Community Boards (SFCB). The following data from the SFCB were taken from an extensive evaluation project (Blad 1996; Merry and Milner 1993). Noise and garden/fence complaints are typical neighbour problems. Nuisance situations such as gossip, pet behaviour, children/teenagers, and litter/dirt could in fact be caused by residents living on the block, but the complainant attributes these ‘incorrect’ behaviour patterns to the neighbour. The same can be said about complaints about multiple problems and other complaints. Complaints about noise are by far the most important complaint in the community boards in the
TABLE III
Nature of the complaints (in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>City model (n = 268)</th>
<th>Neighbourhood model (n = 86)*</th>
<th>Total (n = 354)</th>
<th>SFCB (n = 2,190)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Noise</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Insults/harassment/gossip</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pet behaviour</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Multiple problems</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Children/teenagers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Garden/fence</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Litter/dirt</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other complaints</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In 8 of the 94 cases the cause of the complaint is unknown.

Netherlands. Compared to the SFCB this percentage is a lot higher. The other percentages are notably higher in the SFCB, especially insult/harassment/gossip and other complaints. The high percentage of other complaints is of course caused by a different manner of categorisation. Insult/harassment/gossip on the other hand does show a significant difference in the amount of complaints that were mediated in the SFCB.

Unfortunately, we cannot draw a distinctive picture of the characteristics of the first and second parties. This is due to insufficient data. But, we did find some interesting patterns. The first party is usually a little older than the second party. Women are filing the most complaints, since they are more at home. There is also a tendency to complain more about residents with children, than about residents without children. Most of the people who file a complaint are autochthonous, only one third of the complaints concern allochthonous neighbours. Most of the complaints were already known to existing institutions such as the police, housing associations or the local government. People were also asked if they already knew about the possibility of community mediation. More than half of the first party were familiar with its existence, while only one fifth of the second party had that knowledge.

11 We agreed with the project co-ordinators that they would keep the registration, but this was not done reliably (see note 9).

12 This is also an effect of the (still) low participation of women in the Dutch labour process.
Effects of Community Mediation

Community mediation is focused on the restoration of communication between two conflicting neighbours. Naturally, such a process can take quite some time. It is also difficult to measure in objective criteria. In order to get an idea of the effects, we have divided the process of community mediation into four different phases, whereby each phase works selectively:

1. **registration**, here we find the first selection of cases;
2. **intake of the first party** (the complainant), here the mediator decides if the case can be mediated and whether or not the complainant wants his case to be mediated;
3. **intake of the second party**, here we find the same kind of selection as in phase II;
4. **mediation**, both parties want to talk and come to an agreement.

In practice we found a wide variety of possible outcomes during the process of mediation. Logically we distinguished four possible outcomes:

- the conflict is solved through mediation;
- the conflict is solved without mediation;
- the case is referred to another institution;
- the conflict cannot be referred.

In Tables IV and V we have given an overview of the case histories by combining the process and the outcomes. If you read the Tables horizontally, you will see the outcomes per phase, as well as the drop out rate during each phase in the process. Vertically, you will see the outcomes related to the different phases. In other words, the rows are concerned with the process of mediation, while the columns are concerned with the outcomes of mediation. For instance, in the city model during phase III (intake of the second party) 9% of the cases were solved without mediation, 4% of the cases were referred, and 22% of the cases were unplaceable. In phase III 35% of the cases were processed, which left 22% of the total registered cases to reach phase IV.

When we compare both models, we notice several differences. The neighbourhood model shows a high dropout rate during phase I, 31% of the cases are referred or seem unsuitable for mediation. In the city model this is only 13%. An explanation for this difference could be the fact that the city model is more distant to people, which results in a first selection. In a neighbourhood the distance between people is less, which makes it easier to call community mediation with all kinds of problems.
During phases II and III we see a reversal of this pattern. The dropout rate in the neighbourhood model is low (II: 15%, III: 17%), while this is higher in the city model (II: 30%, III: 35%). The conclusion is that when one reaches phase II, the neighbourhood model leads more people towards mediation and agreement. This is probably due to the proximity of social relations. It is more difficult to leave the process when you know – albeit vaguely – the mediators. The city model may have mediated fewer cases; this only applies to the percentages. When we look at the actual amount of cases, the city model seems steadier.

What is the effect of community mediation? Community mediation has three types of effect. The primary effect is defined as an actual mediation plus agreement (A). The secondary effect (A+B) is defined as situation A plus those conflicts solved by the parties themselves after having contact with community mediation (B). The tertiary effect (A+B+C) is defined as situation A or B and when the case is referred to another organisation (C).
In Table VI we compare the effects between the city and the neighbourhood model. The neighbourhood model seems to be more effective in settling disputes between neighbours than the city model. Of all the cases in the city model, 37% are unplaceable. What remains is 63% and this is what we call the tertiary effect (agreement, solved by participants themselves and referred to another agency). If we narrow this down to the secondary effect (problem solved with or without mediation), the percentage is 38%. If we narrow this down to the primary effect (agreement through mediation), the percentage is 19%. Of all the cases in the neighbourhood model, 30% are unplaceable. What remains is 70%: the tertiary effect (agreement, solved by participants themselves and referred to other agency). If we narrow this down to the secondary effect (problem solved with or without mediation), the percentage is 40%. If we narrow this down to the primary effect (agreement through mediation), the percentage is 22%.

IS THERE A NICHE FOR COMMUNITY MEDIATION

An important question with the introduction of an experiment such as community mediation is to know whether there is a niche for such an instrument viable enough to make it succeed. Local communities in the Netherlands are sometimes seen as over-regulated from an institutional point of view. Every community has a lot of organisations and institutions to which a resident can turn. We will analyse the institutional discourse with respect to community mediation, a newcomer to the institutional field. Later, we will address this question from a resident’s point of view, when we discuss the survey that we conducted within the neighbourhood.

TABLE VI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>City model (n = 268)</th>
<th>Neighbourhood model (n = 94)</th>
<th>Total (n = 362)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary effect (A)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary effect (A+B)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary effect (A+B+C)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No effect</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aThe three effects are cumulative, therefore adding 'no effect' to the 'tertiary effect' gives 100%.
Institutional Perspectives

The experiments of community mediation in the Netherlands must be seen in the light of the strong professionalisation in social work. In contrast with the USA—with its strong tradition of community organising and self-help organisations run by volunteers (Adriaansens and Zijderveld 1981)—the Netherlands can be characterised as a strong corporate welfare state with a high level of social organisation by professionals (Esping-Andersen 1990). At the neighbourhood level this translates itself into a patchwork of professional organisations, all concerned with helping neighbourhood residents. In this setting the question rises: will community mediation be accepted?

What is the communis opinio of professional (and voluntary) workers in the institutional environment? To examine this question we have conducted 150 half-structured interviews with professionals in the field, such as community workers, policemen, social workers, doctors, lawyers, etcetera. Most respondents seem to think that in a complex, pluralistic society conflict is ‘normal’, often unintentional, and it has to be solved. Four different models can be identified from our material.13 Common in all interviews is the notion that being in community inevitably leads to conflict.

In the first, the instrumental model, low costs and effectiveness are the most important criteria. In this model, spokesmen of the Police Department and Justice Department define community mediation as an instrument for conflict resolution, supplementing existing channels of conflict resolution. The type of argument used is mainly economic (reduction of the court caseload).

In the second, the formalistic model, equal rights, equal treatment, and equal accessibility are important criteria. A situation where community mediation would function independently from existing organisations and institutions could threaten its quality and authority. Legal and other procedures should be followed properly; otherwise community mediation could lead to escalation of neighbour conflicts instead of conciliation. Supporters of this view fear abuse of power, and corruption by the participants. It is inherent in this model that community mediation has to be ‘tested’ by quality measures from other institutions. The type of argument used is mainly judicial.

The third, the norm-forming model, sees community mediation as a way of establishing and reaffirming cultural expectations, values and norms that

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13Our material is based on interviews conducted before and after implementation.
‘exist’\textsuperscript{14} in the community. Through open and public discussions,\textsuperscript{15} citizens, e.g. neighbours learn (again) to behave as expected by others and to communicate social constructions amongst one another. The type of argument used is mainly sociological.

The fourth, the \textit{service model}, sees community mediation as a community service, provided by trained volunteers. People who ask for help in solving conflicts or discussing forms of nuisance ask a third party to provide the service of mediation (or panel chairman). The service model maintains that people do not ‘cause’ problems ‘on purpose’. Rather, they are not aware that their actions can be offensive for other parties. Conflicts and irritations arise from the different interpretation of actions. Solutions for conflicts (and irritations) can be found through direct and private communications between neighbours, supported by a ‘host’, as the best way to eliminate miscommunications. The type of argument used is mainly socio-psychological.

The models can be empirically attributed to different institutional settings. The instrumental model is common among social engineers, policymakers, and politicians. The formalistic model is common among police officials, public prosecutors and judges, lawyers and solicitors. The norm-forming model is common among sociologists and community workers. The service model is common among social researchers, doctors, volunteers and citizens, persons that have a need-based view of people and society as a whole.

The respondents are all positive about the initiative of community mediation. They support the bottom-up character of community mediation. And, they also acknowledge the problems that result from too much professionalisation, such as the problems concerning the referral and ‘shopping’ of clients, the fragmentation of assistance, the skimming off of the most promising clients, etcetera (Spierings 1998a). There are many institutional channels for the resolution of all sorts of conflicts. But until recently, in the Netherlands, there were no channels for solving disputes about private nuisance between neighbours. Our research indicates that citizens and professional workers find community mediation a necessary supplement to other conflict solving mechanisms.

\textsuperscript{14}Exist as social facts cf. Durkheim.
\textsuperscript{15}Compare this with Merry’s analysis of mediation in traditional small-scale societies (Merry 1982).
Is There a Need for Community Mediation?

Do citizens themselves say that they need community mediation? We have questioned 508 randomly selected community members in Rotterdam, Zwolle and Gouda. To examine the issues of needs and interests we asked them the following questions:

- **Do you have a conflict with your neighbours?** In the neighbourhood model 48% of the randomly selected community members experienced a nuisance\(^\text{16}\) situation with the neighbours and other community members; in the city model this was experienced by 41%.

- **What forms of nuisance do you experience in your daily life?** Some forms of nuisance are caused by people living in the neighbourhood (parking, pets, litter, and youths), some are caused by people from outside the neighbourhood (fast driving, addiction/junkies) and some are caused by the neighbours themselves (noise, strange smells, and litter). Therefore, not all problems are suitable for community mediation.

- **How often are your neighbours causing a nuisance?** In the neighbourhood model 22% of the people said that their neighbours annoyed them on a weekly basis. In the city model this percentage was a little lower: 11%. We may therefore conclude that in big cities the problem of annoyance with neighbours is larger than in small cities.

- **How do you try to solve neighbour conflicts?** In the neighbourhood model 21% of the community members have the occasional argument with the neighbours, vocal or otherwise (in the city model this percentage is lower: 17%). Of these people in the neighbourhood model, 46% try to talk this argument over. Compared to that, only one in 20 community members asked a third party for help. Many people state that they should solve neighbour problems themselves, but, in practice, many people do nothing.

- **Are you successful in solving the conflict?** In the neighbourhood model as well as in the city model, the results from talking arguments through with the neighbours themselves did not seem very promising. Half of the people who were in conflict tried to talk. Only in one third of the cases did people state that talking made the situation any better; one third states that the situation did not change after the talks; and one third stated that the situation worsened (see also Ellickson 1991). In any case, the self-reported success-rate was rather low.

- **Do you use other conflict solving mechanisms?** In the neighbourhood model 10% of the community members have filed more than one

\(^{16}\)Nuisance is defined as 'annoyance', 'argument' and 'insult'.
complaint against a neighbour in the last year, with the police, the council or the social landlord. In the city model 2% have filed more than one complaint against neighbours. Many community members state that complaining about the neighbours does not help to improve the situation. Many complainants are not satisfied. Neither talking to nor complaining about the neighbours seems to lead to a solution for this problem.

It appears that many community members do have a positive attitude towards community mediation. In total, 60% of the community members in the neighbourhood model said that they would use community mediation in the future, and this corresponds to 43% in the city model. Importantly, community members also report that many conflicts stay unresolved. From this perspective, one might conclude that these problems are lying dormant in communities. This could explain the deterioration of the quality of life in neighbourhoods, the unravelling of social fabric and the feelings of unsafety. Could it be possible that these conflicts are ready to rise to the surface if the circumstances change? Community mediation places these conflicts in a communication form. It prevents the unexpected and unregulated manifestation of conflicts. The survey reveals that there is a need for community mediation.

Seen from a lifeworld perspective, community mediation is a legitimate supplement to the existing channels of conflict resolution. There seems to be a surplus of unresolved neighbour conflicts, which points to a structural social problem. For two thirds, communication without an intermediary seems to lead to a communication breakdown and the end of the ‘neighbourly’ relationship, moving to another house and neighbourhood or letting the conflict ‘slumber’. Not many people use other institutional channels to complain about the neighbours. Of those who do, most are not satisfied with the official handling of their complaint.

**DISCUSSION**

The above analysis leads us to ask several questions. What should the starting point of community mediation be? Should one choose a city model or a neighbourhood model? And, the underlying question: should one focus on whole neighbourhoods or just neighbours? The first question deals with the practical set-up of community mediation, while the second question raises a more fundamental point.

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17The Netherlands has no history of large racial conflicts or other forms of social unrest, such as Birmingham 1982 or Los Angeles 1996.
The answer to the first question seems easy, if we look at the experiments in the Netherlands. The neighbourhood model seems more suitable to re-establish a sense of community between members of a neighbourhood. The neighbourhood model shows better results in the mediation process, on the other hand the city model offers more continuity. Large scale has the advantage of a larger social reach and better continuity in the intake of cases. When we also look at the history of the SFCB, we can conclude that it is possible for a neighbourhood model to grow towards a city scale.

If one's goal is to introduce community mediation in order to solve conflicts between neighbours, and at the same time to re-establish a sense of community, starting with the neighbourhood model seems the best choice. As we stated earlier, professional workers are in favour of a bottom-up approach by settling disputes between neighbours. They support the idea of intervening directly in the lifeworld of people. This is considered the only way to really motivate and empower people to solve their conflicts. The role of the mediator is therefore to facilitate the possibility of people solving their conflicts together.

If we start with a neighbourhood model the question remains: in what neighbourhood do we start? If we look at the experiments with community mediation in the Netherlands, we can observe that the projects were started in well-known problematic neighbourhoods. This implies those areas in cities where social problems accumulate. The choice for these kinds of neighbourhood seems obvious. However, we will argue that this choice rests on a fallacy, namely the fallacy to equate neighbourhood problems with problems between neighbours.

Neighbourhood problems are problems situated on a meso-level, while problems between neighbour are taking place on the micro-level. The fact that a neighbourhood is defined as a problematic area does not say anything about the relationships between the inhabitants of that neighbourhood. Problematic neighbourhoods are measured by the combined percentages of levels of poverty, unemployment, high crime rates, etcetera. To conclude from these indicators that neighbours are in conflict with each other, seems too hasty a step. Neighbourhood problems are mostly socio-economic problems, while problems between neighbours are mostly lifestyle conflicts. Although the two kinds of problem sometimes show some overlap, they are different.

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18 A recent report of the city of Amsterdam points in a similar direction (Gemeente Amsterdam 1999).
19 Goris makes a similar remark when discussing the introduction of neighbourhood justice centres in Belgium. The success of programmes on community safety are dependent on a firm social policy that is occupied with raising the quality of life in the so-called ‘bad neighbourhoods’, and not only focussing on safety aspects (Goris 1996).
Ignoring this difference can be an explanation as to why community mediation seems to work fine in neighbourhood A, while it is not really successful in neighbourhood B.

Nowadays, there seems to be a trend in Dutch local government to finance all kinds of projects in the neighbourhood. Instead of earlier social policy, which was focused on categories of people, the tendency now is to finance areas e.g. neighbourhoods. The selection of neighbourhoods is based on 'objective' criteria, and not on the experience of neighbourhood members themselves, probably influenced also by the availability of European funds stimulating backward areas. When one does not differentiate between neighbourhood problems and a problem between neighbours, the same kind of stigmatisation known from social policy about categories will happen to neighbourhoods (cf. Hortulanus 1995). And the same disappointments will arise regarding the effect of the social policy. Therefore, to deploy community mediation as an approach to problems between neighbours on a meso-level is undesirable.

Community mediation works on the micro-level of the lifeworld: the house, the block, or at most, the street. Both the concept of 'informal justice' (Merry 1997) and the anti-law rhetoric (Shonholtz 1993) seem too narrow to describe community mediation as a conflict solving mechanism in the Netherlands. Community mediation can better be seen from the viewpoint of a sort of DIY-rhetoric (do-it-yourself rhetoric). Most of the professionals we interviewed agreed with the idea that people should have to deal with their own neighbours when having a conflict. It makes no sense to use the court system to rule in mentality problems, because it will not be effective. Supported by the research material presented here, it is important to have a conflict solving mechanism in the neighbourhood for problems that exist close to people. Neighbours are:

- dependent upon one another for a safe and pleasant environment;
- geographically close and bound to some kind of a relationship;
- not successful in solving conflicts by themselves (although they think they are supposed to be).

Based on this typical relationship, a conflict-solving mechanism has to be:

- voluntary, together with a mediator (catalyst) led by community members, in the vernacular language chosen by the participants;
- based on active participation, by people defining their own problems, and choosing their own solutions, maximising the chances for personal commitment;
based on a horizontal model of problem solving, instead of an adversarial model, maximising the chances for lasting relationships.

The evolution of a manner of conflict solving combining these three ingredients can best be understood through the concept of *autonomisation*. By this concept we mean the process by which residents (neighbours, and volunteers) try to (re)capture the conflict solving action space in the community and with that, increasingly reclaim control over their lifeworld. The process of autonomisation can also be seen as the opposite of Habermas’s idea of the ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ (Habermas 1987). Community mediation can empower people to turn the increasing colonisation of the system around into the lifeworld. Instead of dealing with people on a meso-level, the process of autonomisation starts at the micro-level. The role of the (local) government will change in this perspective from an impersonal regulating system into a facilitating organisation, which is based on the needs of citizens.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

Community mediation is not only concerned with solving problems, but also with re-establishing durable relationships between neighbours. This form of participation can lead to ‘empowerment’ — the idea that people feel their actions ‘make a difference’ — not only of the conflicting parties involved but also of the volunteers that help to settle the dispute. Community mediation tries to be more responsive to local community needs and interests. If both the interests and the emotions of disputants can be addressed and reasonably satisfied,20 one can assume that the non-legal agreement or contract would last successfully without force of law or formal authority.

The experiments in Rotterdam, Zwolle, and Gouda show that there is a need and a niche for this kind of dispute resolution in daily life. There is a market for community mediation. Which market, however, is a subject of considerable debate. The Ministry of Justice, financing several projects, would like to see community mediation as a way of reducing court case loads, and as a way of intervening before conflicts escalate. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, and local councils (both responsible for the police force), view community mediation as a way of improving (feelings of) public safety.

20Merry makes an important remark by pointing to the implicit power differences between the conflicting parties. These differences are mostly not given attention in the mediation process (Merry 1997). Unfortunately, due to space and time constraints, we will not explore this further.
Finally, social services and housing associations define community mediation as a way of improving social cohesion, community building through empowerment and participation.

A need orientation to solving conflicts can be an important starting point in a process of institutional analysis. Through time, institutions can become inflexible and fossilised. Seen from the needs, interests and opportunities of the citizens, conflict solving institutions can become unresponsive to human needs, somebody else's institution. From a need-oriented, e.g. service model, it is important that community mediation can develop in an inductive way, bottom-up, pre-institutional, by people defining their own problems and by mediators accepting (and starting from) the definition of the situation made by the complainant and the respondent. If institutions can be fine-tuned and rejuvenated, by mirroring them against instruments that are embedded in the daily lifeworld, space is given for changing needs and mores to boil to the surface.21

In this article, modern society is characterised by processes of rationalisation, professionalisation, and formalisation of relations. Institutions — such as governmental organisations, social welfare systems, etcetera — approach their clients in a top-down manner. Not the needs of citizens, but the supply perspective of the institutions has become the dominant starting point for support. This supply perspective is becoming out of date in a late-modern (or post-modern) society, with its emphasis on cultural pluralism, and individualism, governed by market rhetoric. We understand community mediation as a way for people to reclaim the ownership (cf. Christie 1977; Gusfield 1989) of conflicts that originated in the lifeworld in the first place. In this respect community mediation can be considered a clear example of a process of autonomisation.

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21Important in this respect is the consideration that society, even as an objective reality, is a continuous product of human conduct (see Berger and Luckmann 1967). This holds especially true for community mediation in the Netherlands.


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ABSTRACT. This article casts a critical eye over some of the (often ignored) assumptions which underlie recent appeals to community in crime prevention and control. The article considers the philosophical origins, ambiguities and tensions within such appeals. In so doing, it draws explicitly upon the growth of ‘community safety’ and to a lesser extent ‘restorative justice’ in Britain and considers some of the implications to which this shift may give rise. In particular, it focuses upon the manner in which appeals to community converge and collide with changing social relations which may undermine their progressive potential. Specific attention is given to the implications of: increasing social and spatial dislocation; the commodification of security; and policy debates about a growing ‘underclass’. It is argued that there is much confusion as to how, and to what extent, communities can contribute to the construction of social order. Within the dynamics of community safety and crime control practices there are dangers that ‘security differentials’ may become increasingly significant characteristics of wealth and status with implications for social exclusion. This questions the extent to which crime is an appropriate vehicle around which to (re)construct open and tolerant communities.

KEY WORDS: community, crime prevention, neighbourhood, restorative justice, social policy, underclass

The last two decades have witnessed a significant growth in appeals to community within crime prevention and control (see Crawford 1998b). The emergence of ‘community safety’ as a discrete concern of policy discourse and academic criminology is one of the more tangible expressions of this paradigm shift. Community punishments have a more established history but nevertheless have witnessed a revival of interest. More recently, the emergence of ‘restorative justice’ draws both explicitly and implicitly upon assumptions about community involvement in reactions to crime and the regeneration of community itself. As such, ‘community’ occupies a pivotal place within debates about restorative justice and its potential transformative logic (Walgrave 1994, forthcoming; Crawford forthcoming, b), the ultimate aim of which is the revival of communal bonds of informal control, the reintegration of the offender and the victim within the moral community and the restoration of communal order.

All of these are key elements in the recent British Government’s Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Within the Act is a recurring commitment to implement and enhance ‘community safety’ and restorative justice. Appropriately, this represents an overdue acknowledgement that the levers
and causes of crime lie far from the traditional reach of the formal criminal justice system. Most notably, the Act creates a new statutory duty jointly on local authorities and the police to establish and promote community safety partnerships and to put in place crime and disorder strategies. In large part, this represents a recognition of the need for social responses to crime which reflect the nature of the phenomenon itself, its local specificity and its multiple aetiology. This is supplemented by an important responsibilising duty requiring local authorities, in exercising their various functions, to consider the crime and disorder implications and the need to do all that they reasonably can to prevent crime and disorder in their area (s. 17). In addition, the Act introduces a swathe of other measures designed to enable early intervention in order to support informal mechanisms of control through formal intervention, such as the controversial ‘anti-social behaviour orders’ (s. 1) which fused and confused civil with criminal remedies, evening ‘curfews’ for children under the age of 10 (ss. 14–15), ‘parenting orders’ (ss. 10–12) and the creation of multi-disciplinary ‘youth offending teams’ (s. 39) amongst other developments (see Crawford 1998a).

Moreover, the Act claims to have the promotion of ‘restorative justice’ and the interest of victims at its core, particularly with regard to changes in juvenile justice. The Act and associated policy documents speak of the 3 R’s of ‘restorative justice’: ‘Restoration, Reintegration and Responsibility’ (Home Office 1997, § 9.21). Reparation constitutes a key theoretical and practical base for interventions undertaken under the auspices of ‘reprimands’, ‘final warnings’ (to replace the system of cautioning), ‘reparation orders’, the introduction of ‘action plan’ orders and the work of ‘youth offending teams’, as well as the most recent proposals for Youth Offender Panels as outlined in the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Bill 1999. Together, the proposals appear to represent a significant development in the incorporation of restorative justice in England and Wales, to the point that, as one commentator notes, restorative justice is “no longer a marginal, irregular and highly localised activity” (Dignan 1999, p. 53).

These and analogous developments have not been limited to Anglo-American criminal justice policy and research, albeit that this has been the site of the most prolific activity. Continental Europe has seen parallel, albeit different, developments. France, for example, has seen the elaboration of a discourse of *Justice de proximité*—or proximal justice—with significant appeals to community.\(^1\) As Wyvekens (1997) has argued this embodies three

\(^1\) *Justice de proximité* approximates most closely to notions of ‘community justice’, albeit that ‘community’ is a term which translates poorly into French (Crawford forth-
principal dynamics, namely: a ‘territorial proximity’ through processes of decentralisation which seeks to locate responses within and through communities; a ‘temporal proximity’ which affirms the need to develop faster procedures to deal with case-overload and to bring cases to a speedier resolution; and a ‘human proximity’ which asserts the belief that the parties to a dispute should be the subjects and not objects of justice, thus referencing restorative justice arguments. This policy has seen the rapid spread of the Maisons de Justice et du Droit (MJD) across France, which (amongst other things) offer mediation of cases under the supervision of local prosecutors, as well as victim-offender mediation provided by victim and probation related services (Faget 1997; Crawford forthcoming, a). More recently, the MJD model has been appropriated and adapted by the Dutch under their policy of Justitie in de buurt or ‘neighbourhood justice’ (see Boutellier 1997).

These diverse developments, with their various appeals to community, draw upon the presupposition that the contemporary crime problem is, in part, associated with the decline of community as the mainstay of social life. As such, they seek to encourage a stronger and more participatory civil society. In so doing, they challenge many of the modernist assumptions about professional expertise, specialisation, state paternalism and monopoly. As such, they potentially allow for a fundamental shift in the way in which crime and its prevention are governed. They tentatively offer a more fertile soil in which a progressive criminal justice policy—which turns away from the ‘punitive populism’ of recent years—may establish itself.

However, in this article I wish to cast a critical eye over some of the (often ignored) assumptions which underlie recent appeals to community in crime prevention and control and their potential implications for future social relations. I begin with an examination of the philosophical foundations upon which contemporary appeals to community are founded as well as the uncertain and confused notions as to how communities can contribute to the construction of social order. I then go on to consider the manner in which appeals to community converge and collide with changing social relations which may undermine their progressive potential. I identify and review the implications of three particular areas of special attention: first,
the increasing social and spatial polarisation and concentration of poverty and wealth; secondly, the commodification of security; and thirdly, policy debates concerning a growing ‘underclass’. Finally, I question the extent to which crime is an appropriate vehicle around which to (re)construct open and tolerant communities.

**IDEOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS**

Underlying policy initiatives around community crime prevention is the prevailing idea that crime results from a failure or breakdown of community life. This degeneration is traditionally associated with a failure of the processes of communal socialisation and informal social control. The theoretical underpinnings of this approach owe much to the heritage of Chicago School notions of ‘social disorganisation’, particularly as developed by Shaw and McKay (1942). The more recent revival of appeals to community is rooted in both a collapse of faith in the effectiveness of formal processes of criminal justice — institutions of policing, prosecution, punishment and prisons — stemming from the ‘nothing works’ era of the 1970s and a renewal of interest in informal processes of social control, encouraged by the realisation (stimulated by victimisation survey findings) that most offences remain untouched by formal systems of crime control and that the social aetiology of crime is complex and multi-factoral. It is precisely this apparent failure of criminal justice policy ‘solutions’ which has caused many to delve into the ‘imagined communities’ of tradition.

Recent research interest has coalesced around the renaissance of an environmental criminology which has shifted the criminological gaze away from offenders towards offences, particularly their spatial distribution and the environmental factors which may encourage or act as receptors for criminal activity. This important criminological turn has seen the proliferation of ‘criminologies of place’, variously emphasising situational attributes (Clarke 1983, 1992), ‘routine activities’ (Cohen and Felson 1979; Felson 1998) and community level variables (Wilson and Kelling 1982). The revival of academic interest in ‘community’ attributes, notably in the prevention of crime, has dovetailed with wider philosophical notions of communitarianism. These have been met with considerable favour in governmental circles, particularly that espoused by commentators such as Amitai Etzioni (1993). This brand of communitarianism, which has directly influenced the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Labour leadership (Blair 1998), emphasises the moral nature of communities (see Crawford 1996). Etzioni contributed directly to debates in Britain about community safety and crime
prevention (1997a, 1997b). Communities, he argues, "speak to us in moral voices. They lay claims on their members. Indeed, they are the most important sustaining source of moral voices other than the inner self" (Etzioni 1993, p. 31).

This echoes Wilson and Kelling's (1982) 'broken window' thesis whereby community degeneration is viewed as both the social cause and the effect of crime and the fear of crime. This form of 'communitarian moralism' asserts the need to restore communities and their moral voices, through a greater emphasis upon individuals' responsibilities towards, rather than rights over, their communities. The reinvigoration of 'community', it is argued, facilitates informal social control mechanisms which prevent crime. Strong communities can speak to us in moral voices, allowing the policing by communities rather than the policing of communities.

Within the restorative justice literature the decline of 'community' is associated with both increased victimisation and the theft of disputes by the modern state. Restorative justice becomes both a vehicle for the revival of community and is premised upon the existence of community as a pre-eminent site of social control. In this virtuous cycle, 'community' is a means to an end, as our moral voices are nourished by communities and our moral values are attainable because of the social pressures, such as 'reintegrative shaming' (Braithwaite and Mugford 1994), which communities bring to bear on their members. But, it is also an end in itself, in that the restoration of 'community' is evidence of a moral order which acts to prevent crime. In this context, both means and ends can, and often do, collide and become confused.

Despite the growth of interest, particularly in the restorative justice literature, with communities which extend beyond spatial boundaries, it is wrong to disconnect communities from any sense of geography, even at the turn of the millennium with the burgeoning global technologies which stretch and disembed time and space (Giddens 1990). Whilst advocates of restorative justice have developed important understandings of 'communities of care' which stretch beyond 'place' — through networks of obligation and respect between an individual and those who care about him or her (Braithwaite and Daly 1994, p. 195) — communities for most people, particularly in a European context, remain highly determined by geography. Moreover, this is particularly salient with regard to crime which (like poverty and wealth) remains markedly concentrated spatially.
More Community Equals Less Crime?

Appeals to community assume that there is a relationship between a lack of ‘community’ and the existence of high levels of crime. Disorganised communities — which lack a sense of mutuality and cohesiveness, where people are unwilling to intervene in support of communal order as ‘no one cares’ — are associated with high levels of crime and, inversely, low crime areas are associated with well organised and cohesive communities. Yet, ‘community’ is not synonymous with social order. There is much criminological evidence to suggest that ‘organised communities’ can be crimogenic, such as criminal gangs, football hooligans and deviant subcultures. ‘Organised’ communities can produce both disorder and foster high levels of crime. Collective values of a community may serve to stimulate and sustain criminality. Communal values themselves can be crimogenic.

Contrary to the assumption that crime is associated with a lack of informal control, Hope and Foster’s (1992) research on two crime-prone public sector housing estates in England found that informal control mechanisms were not absent in all high crime areas. High crime communities can be both disorganised and ‘differently organised’ (Evans et al. 1996). Inversely, areas with low rates of recorded crime — most notably middle class suburbs — do not display the characteristics traditionally associated with ‘community’: intimacy, connectedness and mutual support. They do not rely upon the types of informal social control mechanisms so beloved by communitarian theorists, albeit that they may respond rapidly to crises or external threats. However, in such circumstances they are more likely to call upon the intervention of formal control mechanisms and to access institutional resources.

Here all too often, there exists a slippage between the empirical authenticity of ‘community’ as distinct from its normative appeal: between what ‘community’ is and what it ought to be. Much of the recent communitarian literature is marked by exactly such a rhetorically powerful slippage, such that many communitarians seem to want it both ways. The present weakness of ‘community’ is simultaneously seen as ‘the problem’, the cause of most contemporary social ills, and ‘the solution’ in that their very weakness is associated with a lack of over-bearing control, coercion and intolerance of others. Within contemporary weak communities — or ‘light communities’ (Young 1999) — people are assumed to be able, and

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2The Mafia, noticeably absent from Chicago School theories despite its activity in Chicago of the 1920s and 1930s, is a striking example.
potentially prefer, to switch and move freely between communities if they disagree with their practices or values, and/or remain within a ‘community’, whilst dissenting from the dominant moral voices therein. On the one hand, contemporary ‘light’ communities are held up as examples of how communities can allow sufficient space for individual or minority dissent, innovation and difference, and yet they are also seen as insufficient with regard to informal control.

In addition, appeals to community tend to express a slippage between ‘tradition’ and ‘community’: between ‘community’ as a sense of something lost and ‘community’ as a focus for building modern democratic institutions which address the problems of social integration and mutual empowerment in an increasingly differentiated and individualised world. Here, the ideal of community needs to confront empirical reality, which reminds us that communities are often marked (and sustained) by social exclusion, forms of coercion and the differential distribution of power relations.

**Little Acknowledgement to Intra-Communal Conflict**

Communities are too often assumed to be largely homogenous entities with easily discernible needs and objectives. This can encourage the perpetuation of what I have elsewhere described as an ‘ideology of unity’ (Crawford 1997, pp. 137–139): where a moral order or consensus is taken as given, rather than constructed through nuanced and complex negotiations. In practice, this often results in the acceptance of the views of the most powerful or well organised interests within a given community. The empirical reality of communities is that they are not the utopias of egalitarianism, which some communitarians might wish, but are hierarchical formations, structured upon lines of power relations. Here lies the danger of ‘moral authoritarianism’, whereby one dominant group or interest is able to impose its values upon others with little regard for individual rights. The moral voice of a community may come to be dominated by unrepresentative élites within communities. ‘In the name of the community’ can become an instrumental totem on the back of which the exclusion of undesirables is legitimised. The consequentialist implications of ‘community’ should warn us against allowing individual or dissenting voices to be silenced by the loud clamour of a community’s sense of ‘moral order’. The reality, in many urban (particularly high crime) areas, is of a cosmopolitan mix of age groups, cultures and social identities. Here, (dis)orderly behaviour itself is differently defined and experienced by divergent groups of people. Intra-communal conflicts over what local problems are, their origins and appropriate solutions
to them, need to be identified, highlighted and negotiated rather than avoided in the stampede for quick solutions.

'Defensive Exclusivity'

This is to be found both in the nature of many crime prevention strategies — notably of a situational kind — which are premised upon the exclusion of strangers or 'outsiders'. Much crime prevention is of a 'community defence' type (Hope 1995). This is most obvious in the use of CCTV cameras, neighbourhood watch, private patrols, regulated entry/access technology and other preventive initiatives which conform to 'defensible space' or 'broken windows' approaches (Newman 1972; Wilson and Kelling 1982). Such strategies embody an assumption about the relationship between offenders and a community. Offenders are viewed primarily as 'outsiders' against whom the 'community' needs to defend itself. Hence, this vision tends to assume an 'us versus them' attitude which feeds into, and is reinforced by, the existence of an 'ideology of unity'. Here, crime and criminals are external 'others' and 'community' becomes something under attack from the outside. There is little sense in which offenders are members of communities, as neighbours, husbands or sons. Captured by this kind of logic, community safety often fails to address forms of crime which involve familial or familiar relationships, such as domestic violence, child abuse and work-based offences. It also often leads community safety energies to be misdirected at 'outsiders' where problems lie within communities.

This insider/outsider dichotomy, which appeals to community can foster, taps deep-seated fears about social identity and otherness, particularly given the tendency of crime to bifurcate the 'rough' from the 'respectable'. Given the anxieties that crime evokes, it can feed fears. The external threat, whether actual or imagined, can become both the reason for, and the means of sustaining, 'community'. Its collective past and future can be defined by reference to a perceived external threat. In such a context, the collective identity which emerges can become idealised, all-pervasive and rigid: conditions in which intolerance breeds. Consequently, crime as the focus of community (re)construction and boundary formation often presents itself as a pre-eminent producer of 'defended communities'.

Relations between Intra- and Extra-Communal Resources

Too much attention has been accorded to the internal dynamics of communities with little regard for the manner in which these mesh with, or
are undermined by the structure of the society around it. A central dilemma of much community crime prevention derives from the difficulty of trying to construct community institutions that restrain crime given their inability to endure the pressures towards crime within the community, the source of which emanate from the wider social structure. Hope (1995, p. 72) rightly notes that much community crime prevention has concentrated on the ‘use values’ of residential areas, including the benefits that stem from neighbourliness, informal support networks, a sense of identity, security and trust. However, there has been insufficient consideration of the ways in which these are influenced—either enhanced or undermined—by the power and resources which internal community members derive from the wider civil society in which a given locality is situated (Hope 1995, p. 24). Little attention has been paid to the dynamics of a neighbourhood’s ‘exchange value’, including how properties are valued by prospective residents, investors and landlords. The important point is that the latter can serve to undermine or damage the former.

Furthermore, while a focus upon ‘use values’ tends to direct attention towards the intrinsic qualities of particular neighbourhoods, with implications for pathologising them, a focus upon ‘exchange values’ directs attention to the position of a community within the wider urban framework and political economy. The danger is that community safety and ‘restoration’, in this new discourse, become the responsibility of the community, with little consideration given to the place that a community occupies within a wider political economy and the way in which this may sustain crime or undermine efforts at community crime prevention.

The Paradox of Imposing Civility through Coercion

There remains a central paradox in trying to impose civility through coercion which lies at the heart of much restorative justice and community safety. In some senses, this echoes a paradox at the very heart of appeals to community. The proposals in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 in England and Wales express this contradiction acutely in the use of various curfews and court-based ‘orders’—such as the ‘anti-social behaviour order’, ‘reparation order’ and ‘parenting order’—behind which stand criminal sanctions. ‘Enforced reparation’ is likely to be perceived as punishment by offenders and as lacking in genuineness from the victims’ perspective. Research into victim-offender mediation has shown that “non-material reparation delivered in the shadow of a pending court appearance will generally fail to convince” (Davis 1992, p. 213). Hence, there are real concerns as to the efficacy and effectiveness of compulsory orders. This
kind of intervention is less likely to be effective with uncooperative parents or young offenders. Furthermore, there is a danger that parenting orders imposed upon families under stress may only serve to exacerbate familial conflicts.

**The Embrace of 'Social Disorganisation'**

Recently, the work of Robert Sampson and colleagues (Sampson et al. 1997; Sampson 1998) has sought to recast theories of 'social disorganisation' and address some of the above mentioned ambiguities in understandings of community crime prevention. This they have done around the concept of 'collective efficacy'. In a study of residents in Chicago, they found that rates of violence were lower in urban neighbourhoods characterised by 'collective efficacy': "it is the linkage of mutual trust and the willingness to intervene for the common good that defines the neighbourhood context of collective efficacy" (Sampson et al. 1997, p. 919). Neighbourhoods vary in their capacity to achieve common goals. Collective efficacy, therefore, is concerned with the realisation of common values and the ability of groups to regulate their members according to desired principles. They found that in neighbourhoods scoring high on 'collective efficacy', crime rates were 40% below those in lower scoring ones. They go on to suggest that the impact of 'collective efficacy' is enhanced if it articulates with the efforts of crime control agencies. Moreover, residential stability fosters 'collective efficacy', albeit that residential stability is determined by the quality of incomes, jobs, schools and housing available. Intervention, therefore, they conclude, should focus on those social and economic factors which foster the development of 'collective efficacy'.

However, the importance of 'collective efficacy' lies less in its attempts to recast 'social disorganisation' theories and more in its desire to connect the internal characteristics of a community with a political economy of the wider social formation in which it is located. Sampson and colleagues assert that: "collective efficacy does not exist in a vacuum. It is embedded in structural contexts and a wider political economy that stratifies places of residence by key social characteristics" (Sampson et al. 1997, p. 919). Sampson (1998) asserts that 'collective efficacy' is concerned with the realisation of social control which does not equate with conformity and is not homogeneous, whether cultural or socio-demographic. Nevertheless, the concept appears to remain trapped within the 'social disorganisation' embrace of judgements about what 'normal' or desirable order is or ought to be. It presupposes that 'collective efficacy' is non-crimogenic. Many
criminal organisations and youth subcultures across Europe, however, reflect similar characteristics. Further afield, the Japanese bosozoku, gangs of street youths, and yakuza, networks of adult male criminal organisations, undoubtedly exhibit high degrees of ‘collective efficacy’.

A political economy of community crime prevention, to which debates about ‘collective efficacy’ have contributed, needs to focus upon both the internal and external power relations and the way in which the latter mesh or conflict with the former. Hope (1995) draws a useful distinction between horizontal and vertical dimensions of power. The horizontal dimension includes the ‘social relations among individuals and groups sharing a common residential space’ and refers to “the often complex expressions of affection, loyalty, reciprocity, or dominance” (Hope 1995, p. 24). The degree to which people within a community can relate to one another upon these lines will greatly influence the effectiveness of any crime prevention programme. The vertical dimension, by contrast, refers to “relations that connect local institutions to sources of power and resources in the wider civil society of which the locality is acknowledged to be a part” (Hope 1995, p. 24). It is this vertical dimension which much community crime prevention has wrongly neglected, for both dimensions need to be mutually supportive in order for community crime prevention to be effective:

While the principal mechanisms for maintaining local order may be expressed primarily through the horizontal dimension, the strength of this expression — and hence its effectiveness in controlling crime — derives, in large part, from the vertical connections that residents of localities have to extracommunal resources. (emphasis in original, Hope 1995, p. 24)

It is this kind of thinking which is so often absent from appeals to community in crime prevention and control.

THE CONCENTRATION OF POVERTY AND CRIME

This is particularly problematic in Britain given the fact that the idea of ‘community’ now converges and collides with a social and geographical map which is becoming ever more fragmented, economically divided and socially stretched. This geographic polarisation of rich and poor has been a marked feature of socio-economic change in Britain over the last 20 years. The spatial concentration of poverty has been exacerbated by the growing wealth of some within the population and the flight of people and capital out of certain localities. This ‘market residualisation’ is producing growing social dislocation which is fundamentally spatial in nature, as documented
by the *Joseph Rowntree Foundation Inquiry into Income and Wealth* (Hills 1995). Notably, there has been an increasing spatial segregation of income and wealth at a highly localised level (Power 1997).

Moreover, not only are wealth and poverty increasingly concentrated in certain areas and among specific groups of people but so too is crime. Research into the distribution of victims reminds us that the prevalence of victimisation differs significantly between areas. Victim surveys have demonstrated that the distribution of victimisation is anything but random. Community level inequalities in crime and victimisation appear broadly to reflect the spatial economic redistribution. As Hope notes: “More than one-half of all property crime — and more than one-third of all property crime-victims — are likely to be found in just one-fifth of the communities of England and Wales” (1997, p. 148). According to analysis of the British Crime Survey, the distribution of victimisation in England and Wales has become more spatially concentrated since the 1970s (Trickett et al. 1995). Moreover, high crime areas appear to suffer a ‘double concentration effect’, whereby not only are they afflicted by higher levels of crime but they are also marked by a greater concentration of multiple and repeat victimisation: such that victims are victimised at a greater frequency rate in high crime areas than in low crime areas. Hence, crime has a distinct spatial dimension, one which is interwoven with inequality and the distribution of poverty. This social and spatial polarisation fundamentally undermines appeals to ‘community’ as a force of social cohesion. This reminds us that appeals to community involvement must not disconnect a concern for community (dis)approval from a concern with political and economic inequality. Community safety and restorative justice should not become bywords for geographic (in)justice!

What is more, as Hope (1995, p. 22) rightly notes, any assessment of the development of community crime prevention needs to comprehend the changing nature of the crime problem in the urban environment. The current dominant process within cities, both in the USA and Britain, is not one of urbanisation and growth, as it was in Chicago in the 1930s, but is a fundamentally different process of ‘de-urbanisation’ or ‘counter-urbanisation’, through which cities are losing populations to more suburban and rural areas. The flight from Britain’s metropolitan areas between 1981 and 1994 is estimated to be 1.25 million more people leaving than arriving, equivalent to a net migration loss of 90,000 a year. For example, in Inner London between 1990 and 1991 the population fell by 31,000 or 1.24% due to migration (Champion et al. 1996). Shifts in community crime prevention paradigms reflect changes to, and perceptions of, crime problems within urban areas. De-urbanisation has tended to highlight the problem of
fragmentation and disintegration of the city, rather than the idea of the city as a united ‘super-organism’ in the throws of growth, upon which the Chicago School’s ideas of community organisation were premised.

THE COMMODIFICATION OF SECURITY

Moreover, appeals to community fuse with concerns about ‘security’ and the new-found sense of people’s own responsibility to prevent or avoid risk. The private sector has been quick to exploit the opportunities presented by the expanding ‘market’ in crime prevention.\(^3\) The past 25 years have seen a boom in the security industry as crime prevention technology has become commodified. The annual turnover of the private security industry in 1994 was estimated to be £2.8 billion according to the British Security Industry Association (Jones and Newburn 1995, p. 226). What is more, the number of people employed in the private security industry in a policing capacity has outgrown the number of public police officers. One estimate suggests that by the end of 1994 some 7,850 firms were employing more than 162,000 people. This compares with 142,000 people employed within the public police force.

And yet, security is more complex a phenomenon than commodification would suggest. It is defined in relation to an *absence* in time and in space (Spitzer 1987, p. 47). It is the negative corollary of fear, risk and danger. Conceptually, security embodies no positive attributes but rather lacks contrary ones. Security is the quest for a situation or moment in which something undesirable does not exist or does not occur. As such, it embodies elements of subjectivity but is also subject to manipulation on the back of public anxiety. Nevertheless, it informs very real choices that people make regarding, where they go, where they live, where they shop, their leisure activities, etcetera. Moreover, increasingly it is privately controlled spaces which appear to offer greater security through their use of technologies, cameras, guards, fences and so on. In very everyday ways many of us buy into the commodification of security and in tangible ways this may pacify and assuage our fears, albeit that these private ‘zones of governance’ are themselves predicated upon, and potentially their appeal lies in, processes of social exclusion.

Despite the rationalistic tones of much security discourse, security as a commodity is intrinsically related to complex individual and collective

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\(^3\) The second issue of this journal (1999) was devoted to the topic of private security.
sentiments of insecurity, anxiety and fear, all of which are connected to wider, subjective and non-rationalistic elements of social identity and well being. Buying ‘security’ may be a way in which actors can attempt to situate and interpret themselves and the world around them as stable, coherent and manageable despite, or maybe because of, the realities of uncertainty, fragmentation, powerlessness and a loss of collective identity. As such, it may represent a quest for an unattainable and imaginary idyll in which we seek comfort, reassurance and order. And yet, security speaks to those seeking it through assurances and guarantees as to its objective effects. Here, the quest for ‘security’ and appeals to community connect with and sustain each other. The rhetorical force of the language of community, as with quests for security, lies in the fact that it speaks to our fears at the same moment as it whispers to our fantasies (Lacey 1996, p. 110). It has a “profound emotional legitimacy” (Anderson 1983, p. 14), in that it holds out the ideal of genuine human identity, connectedness and reciprocity precisely at a time in which they appear most absent.

More pertinent for our purposes is that this commodification adds a potentially pernicious dimension in which ‘security differentials’ increasingly become significant characteristics of wealth, power and status. The ‘marketisation of security’ and the power of the crime prevention and insurance industries to fan anxieties can serve to exacerbate this process. The resultant ‘anxiety market’ may have an inexorable ratcheting effect due to the insatiability of security. In this context, as Mike Davis notes from the American experience, “security generates its own paranoid demand” (1990, p. 224). The marketisation of security challenges individuals and groups to act as ‘responsible’ rational choice actors in weighing up the risks and security dimensions of social interaction. And yet, these are individual choices which may impact upon others’ security and sense of safety. Hence, in a regime of choice in which security is an exalted – albeit potentially insatiable – commodity there may be an inherent antagonism between feeling secure and being social. The individualistic quest for personal security may undermine the public sphere and people’s experience of it – particularly as people withdraw from it.

Investments in security as a commodity are at best tentative attempts to control an unknowable, unpredictable and risky social world. This requires an investment of faith, one which is always subject to being undermined by new developments or shifts in feelings of (in)security. Consequently, the commodified notion of ‘private security’ may itself be an oxymoron. First, in the sense that it is an unachievable goal: “a new form of ‘magic’ within a system that eschews the invisible and the unknowable” (Spitzer 1987, p. 47). Perversely, the acquisition of more and more ‘security as commodity’,
may serve to undermine feelings of genuine 'security' by institutionalising anxiety.

Secondly, on the one hand, 'security as commodity' appears to offer 'consumers' real choices, as to what to purchase, through which they can confront and try to manage the social environment which envelops them. On the other hand, these choices carry with them anxieties and uncertainties, which demand further responsibilities and trust. Security as an ideal remains an illusion and one perpetually subject to potential fracturing. Having invested in 'security' (technologies or people), its failure to secure may deal a severe blow to any trust relations which that person had sought through expert systems or personnel, ones which subsequently may be hard to repair. In addition, the outcome of these choices—despite the manner in which they may meet a real need in the short term—serve to undermine 'community'.

Moreover, the central paradox of community crime prevention is that there is often an inverse relationship between existing activity and need. Years of research have shown that community responses to crime are easiest to generate in exactly those areas where they are least needed and hardest to establish where the need is greatest (Rosenbaum 1988). This tends to mean that community safety activity is easier to sustain in homogenous, middle-class suburbs rather than heterogeneous, working-class inner-city neighbourhoods. This paradox is compounded by the problem of geographic displacement. Whilst the displacement effect of community safety measures may not be absolute, even if small it is likely to produce conflicts between 'local', intra-area and more general, inter-area definitions of 'success'. Given this paradox, combined with the greater ability of those who can afford to purchase expensive crime prevention technologies, crime may merely shift from those best able to protect themselves onto those already most vulnerable.

This can be aggravated by a further process whereby the greater capacity for more affluent communities to engage in community safety activities may serve to skew existing public resources into those areas. This has been the experience of neighbourhood watch in the UK and USA, where schemes—more easily established and maintained in wealthier neighbourhoods—draw more heavily upon police resources, in order both to set them up and service the demands generated by them. Perversely, this acts to suck public resources towards those places which least need them and those people most capable of protecting themselves. The insurance industry with its actuarial logic can fuel this process by shunning risky, high crime areas and offering incentives to install crime prevention technology and join community safety initiatives such as neighbourhood watch. Community
safety in this context may come to be seen more as a ‘club’ good rather than a ‘public’ good.

Herein lies the potential space for a vicious ‘spiral of ghettoisation’ to develop momentum, whereby communities increasingly form themselves, and construct their boundaries, around concerns and anxieties about crime. Against the background of existing social polarisation, where the marketisation of security and the logics of private insurance prevail, appeals to ‘community’ can form a heady mix. With crime as a focus for the formation and sustenance of ‘community’, the concern is that anxieties over security may lead to introspective localism and result in defensive and parochial communities. In this scenario, communities more closely resemble ‘contractual communities’—combining atomistic individuals as conceived by rational choice theorists—in which members agree to be connected for personal benefit, rather than the havens of interconnectedness and mutuality as envisaged by communitarians.

This dynamic is particularly evident in relation to property and housing where the marketisation of crime and insecurity has had particular effects. In the USA there has been a significant expansion of ‘gated communities’ (Blakely and Snyder 1997)—or ‘private residential associations’—a generic term for planned residential developments regulated by a complex of land-use servitudes. Some developments have physical perimeters and controlled access, often guarded and patrolled by private security police. It is estimated that over 30 million US citizens—nearly 15% of the population—now reside in some kind of planned, private residential association. It is expected that by the year 2000 this figure will have reached 50 million (cited in Alexander 1997, p. 223). In Britain the extent of such developments is less pronounced and less well documented. Moreover, there is a need to be wary of transporting dystopian vision from the USA into Britain or other European societies, with little sensitivity to the specificities of different cultural contexts. The notion of ‘order’, and hence the sense of order to which individuals and groups aspire, is by no means homogenous, but rooted in cultural assumptions. These cultural differences inform the very different experiences of ‘ghettoisation’ in North America and Europe (Wiles 1992).

**Community Safety and the ‘Underclass’**

A particularly troubling and persistent problem with much community-based crime prevention, including that informed by the Chicago School theories of social disorganisation, is the way in which it constructs and perpetuates the notion of the ‘pathological community’. The conceptual confusion
surrounding 'community' and the virtuous cycle within which community and prevention are symbolically connected provide an ideological terrain upon which it becomes easy for certain socially deprived areas, which do not accord to the idealised notion of the community-crime prevention equation, to be written off as beyond redemption. This creates ripe conditions in which 'social problems' may be seen not as the product of government policies but of poor moral standards within communities. Hence, certain communities line up alongside offenders as blameworthy for their 'crime problem'.

These 'irredeemable' communities are 'Britain's dangerous places' (Campbell 1993), where marginalised youths (neither full consumers nor citizens), vagrants, drug abusers, prostitutes and so forth are identified as the architects of neighbourhood change and economic decline, rather than as its victims. Alongside them are those forced to share or inhabit the same spaces and those unable or unwilling to flee, and powerless to make a significant difference. Hence, the antithesis of the idyllic crime-free community in which people 'care for each other' is the crime-ridden, sink neighbourhood in which 'no one cares'. This pathological understanding of 'community' — which shadows its rose-tinted alter ego — has the potential, not only for undermining the tolerance of diversity in heterogeneous communities through 'norm enforcement', but also for creating modern 'no go' areas in and around our major cities. Both 'failed' individuals and communities in the present neo-liberal political climate, which celebrates autonomy, choice and responsibility, come to be seen as culpable, liable and thus justifiably blamed, for their own marginalisation and exclusion.

It is here that debates about the so-called 'underclass' connect strongly with appeals to community. Charles Murray (1990, 1994), a chief proponent of the term, has argued that in both the USA and Britain an 'underclass' has emerged of people who are morally and culturally cut off from mainstream society. This 'underclass' is identified by reference to high levels of crime, single-parenthood (illegitimacy) and unemployment (including the 'never-employed'). The growth of these social ills is taken as proof of a growing 'underclass'. But for Murray the 'underclass' is a 'behavioural' category not merely a descriptive one: "when I've used the term underclass I am indeed focusing on a certain type of poor person defined not by his condition e.g. long term unemployed, but by his deplorable behaviour in response to that condition" (Murray 1990, p. 68). In this context, the term is used to evoke the idea of a class of people set apart economically, geographically, culturally and morally. This 'underclass' is seen as borne of a 'culture of dependency' due to over-generous social benefits and welfare, which have destroyed responsibility and entre-
preneurialism from a whole class of people. Moreover, this ‘underclass’ is perceived to be the product of pathological institutions — families, schools and communities — whose failure to socialise and inculcate self-control has produced young people who are socially and morally disconnected from the rest of society. As such, they have different values.

However, the notion of the ‘underclass’ — even when used by centre-left critics like William Julius Wilson (1987) — is problematic, first, because it obscures the inequalities among the majority, the two thirds or ‘overclass’, who are cast as sharing the same experience and social values. Secondly, the ‘underclass’ themselves appear as homogenous, driven by the same culture and experience (be it a culture of dependency or of deprivation). Moreover, this ‘culture’ is conceptualised as alien to, and apart from, the rest of society. However, Carl Nightingale (1993), amongst others, has vividly illustrated how the so-called ‘black underclass’ in the USA, notably in Philadelphia where his research was based, far from being culturally disconnected from dominant society are steeped in mainstream culture. In many senses, they are ‘all American’. They embrace, rather than reject, dominant American cultural values. They have the “experience of being both maliciously cast out of the country’s mainstream and thoroughly and enthusiastically included in it” (Nightingale 1993, p. 12). On a similar note, in England, Campbell (1993) has shown how young men involved in urban riots on some of Britain’s peripheral housing estates in 1991, were not rejecting dominant male values derived from key institutions, such as the media and the police, but aping and reconfiguring them.

Hence, processes of social, economic and political exclusion can co-exist alongside cultural (over)inclusion. This set of social process, Jock Young (1999, pp. 81–82) likens to a ‘bulimic society’ which consumes and culturally assimilates masses of people through education, the media and consumerism only to spew them out: to eject them from its economic and social mainstay. This suggests a much more nuanced understanding of the social processes by which groups of people are forced to live on the peripheries of society and, fundamentally, the nature of their relationship to the rest of society. It is not a simple ‘us and them’ bifurcation which the language of ‘underclass’ suggests, but a much more complex process in which ‘we’ are constituted by, and constitutive of, each other. The danger of appeals to community is that they seek to fix identity — even if this is a ‘community of choice’ rather than a ‘community of fate’ — often in contradistinction to an ‘other’. The concern is that notions of the ‘community’, of organic wholeness and of a given fixed collectivity, can be inimical to a politics of difference and tolerance.
The danger is that community safety and restorative justice accord to crime (and reactions to it) a centrality which it may not deserve. Responses to crime are fundamentally social and cultural events which seek to reaffirm a collective consciousness and social cohesion. They are not, however, the mainstay of civility. In claiming a centrality in the construction of a just social order restorative justice and community safety proponents tend to accord an overriding position to reactions to crime. A potential consequence of according to crime a central place in the construction of the social order, is that fundamental public issues may become marginalised, except in so far as they are defined in terms of their crimogenic qualities. The danger is that, as a consequence, we may come to view poor housing, unemployment, poor schooling, the lack of youth leisure opportunities and so on as no longer important public issues in themselves. Rather, their importance may become increasingly seen to derive from the belief that they lead to crime and disorder. The fact that they may do so is no reason not to assert their importance in their own right. After all, there are other things which are more important than crime prevention. The fear is that social deficiencies may be redefined as 'crime problems' which need to be controlled and managed, rather than addressed in themselves. This would represent the ultimate 'criminalisation of social policy'.

Here, two related lessons from the past 20 years of research warrant reiteration. First, reactions to crime alone do not constitute sufficient grounds for sustaining community interest and enthusiasm over time, even in places where initial levels of awareness and participation were high (Rosenbaum 1988; Palumbo et al. 1997). Secondly, given the anxieties and emotions that crime evokes and its capacity to bifurcate through deep-seated fears of 'otherness', crime may be an inappropriate vehicle around which to construct open and tolerant communities, as opposed to those which solidify around 'defensive exclusivity'. The preoccupation with security may have less to do with personal safety than with the degree of personal insulation from certain 'others'. As I have stated elsewhere:

Strengthening communities is not always synonymous with the creation of social order and cohesion. An assertion of 'community' identity at a local level can be beautifully conciliatory, socially nuanced and constructive but it can also be parochial, intolerant, oppressive and unjust. (Crawford 1997, p. 294)

In the quest for a more socially just public sphere, community safety and restorative justice have a significant, yet limited, contribution to make. In so doing, we need to be as aware of the dangers of 'community' as to extol
its promises. In many senses, this article is a plea for more nuanced understandings of the limitations of communities, both in community safety and restorative justice, and of the ways in which appeals to community often misunderstand community dynamics, as well as the ways in which these connect with wider socio-economic changes and political discourses.

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When some 30 experts from almost all continents gathered in The Hague, late in 1995, to update and review the methodology of the International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS), and bearing in mind the 1996 wave, some discussion arose about how to explain the much lower Asian crime rates as established in earlier surveys. Many experts who assisted at the meeting felt that some crucial independent variable was missing in the questionnaire.

The task of finding the key proved difficult, however. American experts in particular felt that the decisive missing link must be the neighbourhood. According to this view (Chicago school), a perfect integration into neighbourhood networks, and frequent contacts with neighbours, would be decisive in the prevention of crime. Several contributions in the European Journal’s present issue are implicitly arguing along the same lines.

However, several reservations were expressed during that meeting. Some observers felt that many people prefer to keep their neighbours at some (social) distance, without the risk of getting involved in crime. Anonymous neighbours might, therefore, be seen as a positive feature of modern urban life, and not related to social isolation or, worse, anomie and crime. In the end and in lack of a better alternative, an (optional) question on the frequency of neighbourhood contacts was left in the ICVS questionnaire, but only a few countries decided to use it.

Over dinner (with an Indonesian menu), we had the pleasure of sitting next to each other, with several more colleagues from Asia. During conversation about family matters, the second author spoke about the tradition in Indonesia where successful individuals pay for the education of nephews and even more remote relatives. Given that much family solidarity (which many European students might appreciate [. . .]), we came to the conclusion that the Asian and the Western ways of life may differ less with respect to the frequency of neighbourhood contacts, than with the significance of kinship networks in everyday life.

We felt that a question of this sort should be tested in a comparative perspective. Once the main (Asian) dishes were removed from the table, we took a paper napkin and started drafting a possible survey question.
How embarrassing would it be for you if one of your cousins were convicted of theft and sentenced to one year in prison, and if people around you got to know about it. Would this be very embarrassing, somewhat embarrassing, or would it not be so relevant, or not relevant at all?

The reader will note that we took as the example, a cousin, that is a person who is usually not a source of income for the respondent; in addition, the offence at stake (theft) is universally condemned, whereas a prison sentence might be less embarrassing if imposed for a political offence. We both decided to include this question in the Indonesian and the Swiss ICVS questionnaire.

In Indonesia, only a sub-sample of 200 respondents answered this question. 83% said they would be very ashamed in such an event, and a further 13.5% would be merely ashamed; only 3.5% felt that this would not be relevant to them. Among the 1,000 respondents in Switzerland, 13.5% felt it would be very embarrassing, and 37% conceded it would be somewhat embarrassing; 28% answered, however, that this would not be very relevant, and 21% said it would not be relevant at all.

Obviously, Asian cultures practice shaming to a large extent, although under the form of social exclusion rather than reintegratively. The differences between the Indonesian and Swiss (and probably other European) respondents suggest that offending might have an extraordinarily high price in Asia — for the offender as well as for his remote relatives. In such a context, family solidarity means more than mutual support; it means that one can count on the good behaviour of cousins as a precondition for one’s own success in life.

To sum up, people may feel restrained not by neighbours, but by the consequences of their deeds on the persons they are expected to include in their reasoning. Thinking about one does to others may, therefore, be the foundation of conformism in modern Asia — as well as in traditional European cultures. Thus, the concept of community might need to be rethought around the idea of solidarity with people whom we feel responsible for, rather than around living geographically close to each other, or having frequent physical contacts. We thank our WODC hosts for that dinner at Scheveningen, and for having offered the opportunity to rediscover some basic facts about social life — overthere and overhere.

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ABSTRACT. The authors trace and compare the developments in recorded juvenile delinquency in Hamburg, Prague, Cracow and Budapest from 1991–1997 and then analyse the processing and selection procedures of the various justice systems. They devote special attention to ethnic minorities within this filtering process. The most salient feature is that the crime rates and processing structures in the former socialist countries display considerable similarities. It would almost be possible to speak of a specific type of criminal justice system with a typical form of reaction. While in the West, the large number of suspects is considerably reduced during later stages of selection to a much smaller number (those actually sentenced and/or imprisoned), what the authors call a ‘funnel’ model, in the East a smaller number of suspected offenders enters this selection process, but tends to remain within it and be sentenced — the ‘cylinder’ model. These procedural structures have changed little in the 1990s, and there has certainly not been any increasing alignment of the Eastern systems with the Western one. Indeed, the difference has, if anything, become greater. These lower crime statistics as compared with the West — represented here by Hamburg — are, however, not only the result of equally large discrepancies between the ‘real’ crime rates, but in this regard the pro-active crime prevention measures of the police, which in Hamburg have caused the inclusion of an increased number of juveniles and foreigners in the crime statistics since 1995, have also had a great effect. The research project thus clearly demonstrates the importance of interpreting crime statistics neither as a true representation nor as a distorted reflection of the activities of a criminal justice system. Instead, these statistics should be seen as reflecting specific processing procedures and methods of crime control.

KEY WORDS: comparative research, crime statistics, immigrants, juvenile delinquency, registration

The following data and interpretations are the results of a research project that has been going on in the Criminological Research Department of the Cologne University since the 1980s. In this project, criminal statistics from Central and Eastern European countries are compared and evaluated in conjunction with those from Germany, with special reference to Hamburg. We believe that the theoretical basis of this project differs fundamentally from that of other comparative projects of this kind.
This is because the data on criminality chiefly interest us insofar as they provide information about the criminal justice systems that they depict. In this article, we shall thus not be treating criminality as an independent quantity that is controlled to a greater or lesser extent, but rather looking at it as a phenomenon produced institutionally, a product of state attempts at control (Walter et al. 1997, p. 190). In this way, the picture given by the official statistics is not seen as accurately reflecting the real criminality behind these statistics and thus giving potential insights into it. Nor is it treated as a distorted representation that, once all distorting factors have been taken into consideration, is capable of providing relatively reliable information. We are not concerned with interpreting reality as accurately as possible by tracking down statistical errors. Although the data are still able to be interpreted etiologically and/or according to criteria affecting their gathering, we are less interested here in the comparison of rates of criminality than in comparing processing procedures. For example, the statistical increase in criminal delinquency in the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 can also be put down to a normalisation in statistical procedures relating to crime.

Wherever the detailed interpretation of the data causes problems, the difficulties are always all too familiar in the area of comparative criminology. When statistics from different countries are compared in detail, the difficulty quickly arises, for example, that various crimes are slightly differently defined or are placed in other categories according to the respective legal system. For this reason, the European Commission's plan to bring out a European Sourcebook of Criminal Justice that takes these problems into account, is very much to be welcomed (Jehle 1998, pp. 511 ff).

At the time when the project started, it became possible to compare the developments in registered juvenile delinquency in other countries and under other systems as well. After the radical upheavals of 1989, we also gained the opportunity of observing the processes of national transformation and social change as they occurred. This

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1For information on distorting factors in the criminal statistics of the German police force, see Kerner 1973; Hauf 1992.

2For background to the project see Walter et al. 1997, pp. 189–190; for the most significant results to date see also Walter and Fischer 1988; Walter et al. 1989; Fischer 1990; Walter and Fischer 1991; Pitsela et al. 1992; Fischer et al. 1994.
‘longitudinal section’ in time makes it possible for us to test out the
theories proposed some time ago in Prague – for example, the theory
that the system of juvenile criminal justice there is gradually becoming
aligned with the Western system – on the basis of new statistics on
criminality. Recently, the project has again been able to make use of
data from Hamburg and Prague as well as from Cracow and – in an
incomplete form – from Budapest.

The fact that both the concept of juvenile delinquency and the way
that juvenile delinquency is statistically recorded differs widely, already
hinders any absolute comparison between case statistics. While
juvenile crime statistics in Hamburg and Budapest only include
offenders between 14 and 17 years of age, in Prague ‘juvenile
delinquents’ are aged between 15 and 17 years of age, and in Cracow
13 to 16 years of age. The following article thus almost solely employs
relative figures that have been recalculated according to the number
of the population born in the relevant years. This at least avoids the
distortions that would have arisen because, for example, one more age
group is included in Hamburg than in Prague.

The original plan – one which would have been of both theoretical
and empirical interest – of analysing the processing procedures with
a special focus on ethnic minorities, could also only partially be carried
out. This is owing to the fact that the relevant data are often very
incomplete and unreliable (as in the case of the Roma and Sinti in
Budapest), or of such recent nature that they could not be employed
in long-term comparisons.

In the following, we shall first trace and compare the dev-
lopments in recorded juvenile delinquency in Hamburg, Prague,
Cracow and Budapest from 1991 to 1997 and then analyse the
processing and selection procedures of the various justice systems.
In doing so, we shall devote special attention to ethnic minorities
within this filtering process.

DEVELOPMENTS IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 1991–1997

The percentage of cases solved and the crime rate\(^3\) are traditionally
important indicators when assessing developments in criminality, and

\(^3\)The crime rate refers to the number of suspected offenders per 100,000 inhabitants. Unlike in the case of various earlier publications, this time we had access to police data on
this also goes for the standpoint represented here. Both these figures are of central importance for the way a criminal justice system sees itself.

The justice system uses the crime rate applied to the total population to define its workload, or total input; and the clear-up rate is seen as a proof that its work has been efficient. This often ignores the fact that different success rates in the solving of cases, whether in the comparison between countries or as part of long-term comparisons, are the result of differing methods of crime control— they often do not measure the quality of the control methods, but instead the way these methods are put into force (e.g. increased pro-active measures).

THE CLEAR-UP RATES AND THE DECREASE IN SUSPECT AGE IN HAMBURG

Figure 1 demonstrates how the development in Hamburg clearly differs from that in Prague and Cracow, where the figures are very similar, although on different levels. In Hamburg, the percentage of cases solved has increased steadily since 1991—a development, it must be added, that runs parallel to the increasing rate of crime. The clear-up rate was only 36.8% in 1991, had climbed to 39.7% by 1994, and reached a record level of 49.7% in 1997. The clear-up rate for specific types of crime remains constant throughout, however: on average, 80% of cases involving murder or bodily harm, and 60% of sexual crimes were solved, as compared to a low figure of only 25% in the cases of theft.

The figures for Prague and Cracow show rather more fluctuation. The clear-up rates in both cities sank drastically in the first half of the 1990s, reaching their lowest point in Cracow in 1994 (27.3%) and in Prague in 1993 (18.2%). From here on, both figures climb once more to become fairly parallel to one another. In 1996, relatively high percentages were achieved in both cities: 39.2% in Cracow, and 26.4% in Prague. The developments in both Prague and Cracow would seem to be strongly influenced by the same macro-social factors, and it inevitably suggests that these develop-
ments could be a reflection of the political upheavals of 1989. The clear-up rate is, as in Hamburg, different for each group of crimes. In

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4Concerning the present situation in the Czech Republic, see H. Válková 1998, 1999; concerning the situation in Hungary and Poland see Korinek 1999; Krajewski 1999.
Prague and Cracow, it is also at its highest in the case of murder and bodily harm, and at its lowest in the case of theft (or theft, embezzlement and fraud, which all fall into one category in Prague). The fluctuations noted above are also in evidence in the statistics for the specific crimes. For example, the clear-up rate in Prague in 1993, when the lowest point was reached, was only 12.2% for theft, embezzlement and fraud.

In general, it would be jumping to conclusions to interpret the clear-up rate only or chiefly as evidence of the success and quality of police investigations, as factors that assist the police in their task also affect these statistics. For example, there are groups of offenders that are more easily caught by the police because they take risks and carry out offences in an uncontrolled and spontaneous manner. This is generally the case with juvenile offenders, who also tend to confess more easily (see Kreuzer 1993, p. 189; Walter 1995). Foreign offenders\(^5\) are thus more at risk of being ‘found out’ by the police and represented in the statistics, as they are mostly very young: 22.25% of 20 year olds in Hamburg are foreigners, a figure that decreases steadily in the older age groups (20–40 year olds: 20.66%; 40–60 year olds: 13.38%; over 60 year olds: 4.12%). There is another reason for this increased risk, however: members of ethnic minorities are more a centre of focus for pro-active controls by the police, and are also more frequently reported to the police by other members of the population. This is because they tend to correspond to the common stereotypes of offenders. These stereotypes are not solely a product of racism: they also act as points of orientation, helping order perceptions and bringing about what is known sociologically as a “reduction of complexity” (Luhmann 1981, p. 247, 1973, pp. 23–32).\(^6\)

The statistics for Hamburg displayed some very clear connections when analysed under this aspect. For example, an increased proportion of juveniles has lowered the average age of suspected offenders in Hamburg. The percentage of juveniles among all suspected offenders climbed steadily over the time period in question: 9.7% in 1991, 10.57% in 1992, 11.18% in 1993, 11.12%
in 1994, 12.3% in 1995, 12.41% in 1996, reaching 13.07% in 1997. The parallel plateaus in 1993 and 1994 are particularly striking: the clear-up rate for these years remained constant at 39.7%, while the percentage of juvenile alleged offenders changed minimally, although both figures otherwise display a certain amount of change. This increased proportion of juveniles is to a great extent a consequence of developments in the area of theft. The percentage of juvenile offenders in this area increased from 12.18% in 1991 to 16.10% in 1997. In Prague and Cracow as well, the proportion of juvenile offenders involved in theft is higher than that for all crimes. In this context, it is especially interesting to note that the percentage of juveniles in the statistics for all offences remained constant (in Cracow at 15%) or decreased slightly in the last few years (in Prague from 12.02% in 1991, 10.88 in 1992, 10.32% in 1995 to 9.55% in 1996), whenever the crime rate for juveniles remained constant, as in Cracow, or decreased, as in Prague.

The Hamburg statistics only partly confirm the theory that the increased number of juvenile and foreign alleged offenders helped cause the increase in both clear-up rates and crime rates. Having risen from 41.27% in 1991 and 48.01% in 1992 to 53.14% in 1993, the percentage of foreign juveniles among all juvenile suspected offenders fell again in the years following: from 46.76% to 43.83%. These statistics also provide a further explanation for the stagnation in the clear-up rate in 1993/1994. Although, as these figures suggest, younger juvenile and foreign offenders were the determining factor in the clear-up rate and overall situation regarding recorded crime up to 1993, their place in the statistics has increasingly been taken over by young German offenders since the introduction of the more restrictive policy on foreigners incorporated in the so-called 'asylum compromise' of 1993.

Large fluctuations from one year to the next are often the result of police strategies that can affect the whole spectrum of crime, including offences committed by adults. For example, in 1995, the Police Control Authority of the Regional Police Headquarters in Hamburg produced evidence to show that the great increase, both in certain areas of crime and in the clear-up rate, was the result of specific control measures, not of increased criminality. The two specific factors named were firstly: the larger number of crimes recorded because of increased police activity in the areas of drug-related crime and offences committed by foreigners; and secondly:
the inclusion of statistics from previous years at the close of long-term investigations, for example, in the field of cheque and credit card fraud (Landeskriminalamt Hamburg 1996, p. 13).

The Crime Rate and Structural Comparison

If the crime rates for the four European cities are compared, Hamburg again occupies a special position. In comparison with Hamburg's five-figure crime rate per 100,000 persons for all juvenile crime — that is, crime involving the age group 14–17, which exceeded 15,000 in 1997, the crime rates for the other cities seem very modest: all of them remain below 3,000. In view of this wide gap, clearly demonstrated in Figure 2, the positions of Prague and Cracow as having the highest and lowest crime rates respectively among the other cities in this study can be seen in more perspective. It is more important to emphasise that which these cities have in common, that is, not only a comparatively low crime rate — with the exception of the available statistics from Budapest — but also one that has remained relatively constant up to the present time. The situation in these cities can hardly be called dramatic therefore, with the one exception of the year 1994, in which there was a high crime rate together with the lowest clear-up rate.

Figure 2 shows an increasing number of suspected offenders in the 1990s in Hamburg and Cracow, while the figures for Prague, with the notable exception of 1994, remain fairly constant. All in all, the cities had much the same set of crimes in similar proportions: for example, despite small differences, sexual offences and homicide were at much the same relatively low level everywhere. This finding confirms the results obtained earlier in the project.7

In the case of crimes whose recording is dependent on the extent of crime control procedures, however, and offences that depend on opportunity, such as theft and assault causing actual bodily harm, there is a more obvious increase to be noted. This is confirmed here by the statistics for Hamburg and Cracow.8 The common structures existing among the cities in the former socialist countries in particular, can very easily be seen if the relevant figures are placed next to one another (Figures 3–6).

7For Budapest and Hamburg see Walter and Fischer 1998, pp. 238ff.
8For information on Polish criminal law see Weigend 1998.
In the cities of the former Eastern bloc, the dependence of the rate for all juvenile offences on that for theft is particularly clear: the figures run parallel to one another throughout the 1990s. This not only means that theft makes up the largest part of recorded crime here as elsewhere; it also means that changes in the overall crime rate in these cities only reflect the fluctuations in the rate of theft.
Figure 3. Crime rate Hamburg (per 100,000); by offence. Source: Police statistics Hamburg; Regional Bureau of Statistics Hamburg, as well as calculations of the authors.

Figure 4. Crime rate Prague (per 100,000); by offence. Source: Statistics of the Ministry for Justice, Czech Bureau of Statistics, Prague, as well as calculations of the authors.
Figure 5. Crime rate Cracow (per 100,000); by offence. Source: Police statistics City of Cracow, as well as calculations of the authors.

Figure 6. Crime rate Budapest (per 100,000); by offence. Source: State Institute for Criminology, Budapest, as well as calculations of the authors.
The same observation is valid for Hamburg only in the case of the years prior to 1993. After this, the total juvenile delinquency rate starts to become independent from the rate for theft. There must therefore be other areas of crime than those evaluated that caused an increase, especially in 1995, in the number of all recorded juvenile offences, an increase that is more rapid than that for offences involving theft and bodily harm. And, in fact, the police force itself draws attention to increased control measures for 1995 in the area of drug-related crime and offences by foreigners. These control measures also caused the inclusion of many juvenile offenders. In addition, the phenomenon of extortionary theft among juveniles (so-called Abziehen unter Jugendlichen), which has been much reported and discussed, is according to police sources, decisive for this increase in offences against property (Landeskriminalamt Hamburg 1996, p. 13; see also Pfeiffer et al. 1997, p. 28).

As far as the offences analysed in detail here are concerned, it can be stressed that the increase of the crime rate in Hamburg, particularly after 1995, is as before the consequence of a slight growth in the number of thefts performed by German juvenile offenders; but it can also be attributed to an increase in the number of recorded and reported cases of assault causing bodily harm by both German and foreign juveniles. Tables I and II should make this clear.

According to these statistics, the crime rate for foreign juvenile offenders doubled for offences involving bodily harm in the 1990s, while that of German juvenile offenders rose by 63%. In Cracow, an increase in the number of cases involving bodily harm was also recorded during the same time period. The crime rate per 100,000 population thus rose from 26.05 in 1991 to 102.36 in 1997. This represents a fourfold increase, albeit starting from a very low level, and can be seen as proof of the assumption that there was an increase in juvenile violence in the entire Western world in the 1990s (Pfeiffer 1997).

LEGAL PROCESSING AND SELECTION PROCEDURES

Seen against the background of these increases in the crime rate to be observed in some quarters, the reactions of the criminal justice system are of particular interest. As we know, there is a graded process of selection. At each stage, different groups are filtered from
Juvenile offences involving assault causing actual bodily harm in Hamburg 1991–1997; rate per 100,000 population.

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<td>Germans</td>
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<td>912.21</td>
<td>857.43</td>
<td>876.65</td>
<td>924.35</td>
<td>1,026.10</td>
<td>1,219.64</td>
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<td>1,566.43</td>
<td>1,554.84</td>
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<td>1,854.12</td>
<td>2,170.23</td>
<td>2,350.95</td>
<td>3,072.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Police statistics Hamburg 1991–1997; Bureau of Statistics Hamburg (for population statistics) as well as calculations by the authors.

Juvenile offences against property in Hamburg 1991–1997; rate per 100,000 population.

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>4,612.18</td>
<td>4,971.65</td>
<td>5,119.11</td>
<td>5,203.00</td>
<td>5,985.98</td>
<td>6,328.00</td>
<td>6,198.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-nationals</td>
<td>9,974.88</td>
<td>10,926.25</td>
<td>14,801.49</td>
<td>10,914.15</td>
<td>11,034.25</td>
<td>10,562.33</td>
<td>10,512.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Police statistics Hamburg 1991–1997; Bureau of Statistics Hamburg (for population statistics) as well as calculations by the authors.
was illustrated by the picture of a funnel (representing the Western selection process) and a cylinder (representing the small amount of filtering taking place in the East; (Walter and Fischer 1988, p. 243; Walter et al. 1997, p. 191; Fischer et al. 1994, p. 298).

Despite the great social changes that have taken part in the former socialist countries, this situation has scarcely changed up to now, as can be seen from Figure 7 (for 1996). The comparison of selection
processes in East and West thus shows that there are still no grounds for believing that processing procedures in the criminal justice systems are becoming more similar to one another (Walter et al. 1997, p. 196; Walter and Fischer 1988, p. 243). This is scarcely surprising; up to now, investigations have shown that the crime rate in Prague has remained practically constant, with the exception of 1994 (see Figure 4). This means that the capacities of the justice system have not yet come under any great pressure. In Cracow, on the other hand, where crime rates have increased during the 1990s (see Figure 5), the number of juvenile offenders sentenced to imprisonment is comparatively much lower than in Prague. This alone, however, does not adequately explain why alternative sanctions, which have long been provided for in Czech law through amendment of the 10/12/1993 (with effect from 1/1/94) and the 29/6/1995 (with effect partly from the 1/9/1995, partly from the 1/1/1996), have seldom been made use of in Prague. This lack of change is apparently also due to the characteristically rigid attitudes of legal personnel in the post-totalitarian countries. In specialist studies on the Czech Republic, we can read that the introduction of alternative sanctions does not succeed in practice because of judges who are opposed to these alternatives, and because any tradition of such alternative processing methods is lacking (J. Válková 1998, p. 574). This is by no means the only case in which the representation of criminality in a particular country chiefly reflects the attitudes and processing procedures inherent in that country’s system of justice.9 For example, the present decrease in the number of sentences of imprisonment in favour of fines in Hungary, is seen as having more to do with the fact that the justice system needs money for probation officers. Because of the high costs involved, there is thus little chance of alternative sanctions being applied in Hungary either (Kerezsi 1998).

By comparing data about the selection processes in Hamburg and Prague for 1991 and 1996, we should like to demonstrate how constant the processing procedures have remained despite amendments to the law.

---

9The greater tendency towards punishment procedures in the former socialist countries has always manifested itself in the prison population as well. Taking 1/9/1996 as a point of reference, there were 82.6 prisoners per 100,000 population in Germany, compared with 129 in Hungary, 148.5 in Poland, and 202 in the Czech republic (Council of Europe 1998, p. 64).
It can be seen that processing structures have not changed very much in either city during the 1990s. In Prague, the proportion of suspected offenders to those actually sentenced is 2:1, as was already the case in 1991 and 1985. In other words, on average, one out of two suspects is convicted. In Hamburg, the proportion is 32:1, not including traffic offences and crimes against the State. This 'funnelling' effect has become even more extreme over the years: in 1985 the proportion was 12:1 and in 1991 26:1. In view of these statistics, it is difficult to speak of any increasing resemblance between the systems of crime control.

The capacity of a justice system is limited, so it is not surprising that the filtering process is even more selective in the case of offences against property, as such offences make up more than half of all criminal offences everywhere in the West (Junger-Tas and Terlouw 1994; see Figure 8, which contains data on all juvenile offences for the Wojwod (District of) Cracow). Again, this is particularly noticeable in the data for Hamburg, above all at the first stage of the selection process that takes place between arrest and sentencing.

ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THE SELECTION PROCESS

It is an international phenomenon that members of minorities are overproportionately represented among the criminally prosecuted. It would be possible to interpret this fact etiologically and assume that ethnic minorities are more prone to crime. In this case, it would be necessary to take into account the fact that there is a higher proportion of young men in this group who come from underprivileged backgrounds and have in general a personal history conducive to criminality (Eisner 1998). There is, however, also good reason to suppose that this high proportion reflects the greater likelihood of young foreigners or members of ethnic minorities being recorded as offenders (See Petersilia 1985; Juvenile and Family Court Journal 1990; Tonry 1998).

Although the Hamburg data could not be analysed in detail under this aspect, they generally support this thesis. Results from studies performed in recent years showing that foreign suspects run less risk of a conviction during police investigations owing to problems of communication caused by language and cultural differences, (Reichertz 1998, pp. 269–270) could not be confirmed here. On the
contrary, in 1996, of 4,886 German juvenile alleged offenders, 92 were sentenced (a proportion of 53:1), as compared with 184 out of 3,928 in the case of foreign juveniles (21:1). In Prague, the situation for foreigners was not so disadvantageous. There, nationals and non-nationals were equally as likely to be sentenced. The proportion is 2:1

10Concerning the legal consequences of a sentence and the collision between accepted rules of treatment in the juvenile correctional services with laws concerning aliens see Kleinjans 1997; Schmülling and Walter 1998.
in both cases (nationals: 513 convicted out of 1,060 suspected offenders; non-nationals: 18 convicted out of 39 suspected offenders). This can possibly be put down to the fact that the 'problem' of criminality among the migrant and foreign population has not yet become an issue, either in reality or in the minds of members of the criminal justice system, owing to the small number of relevant cases. Figure 9 shows this situation.

It must be considered, however, whether the low number of cases in Prague could make any clear difference in treatment during the selection process difficult to perceive. Equal treatment by the justice system is at any rate unlikely, because the rate of recorded juvenile crime in Prague is higher in the case of non-nationals than nationals, just as in Hamburg and other places. This not only goes for all recorded offences, but also for each group of offences (see Figures 10 and 11).

In Hamburg, the above-mentioned increase in offences involving assault causing bodily harm among both national and non-national juveniles resulted in a general increase in the number of all offences.
for both groups. The increase in recorded drug-related offences and crimes against laws concerning aliens among non-nationals, and the rise in the number of crimes against property committed by Germans, had a greater effect on crime figures, however (see above; see also Tables I and II).

Because of the very small number of cases involving non-nationals in Prague, only everyday offences such as theft, fraud and embezzlement could be analysed more closely. The crime rate for young foreigners did not differ practically from that for their national counterparts in 1993 and 1994, but in 1996 it was doubly as high as for Czech juveniles (3,432

*Figure 10.* Juvenile crime rate in Hamburg (German and foreign juveniles). *Source:* Police statistics Hamburg; Regional Bureau for Statistics Hamburg and calculations of the authors.
to 1,5503). In view of the minimal statistical basis – 30 non-national suspects as against 762 national suspects in 1996 – one should be cautious when considering this figure as proof of an increase in crime among juvenile non-nationals in Prague.

In Hamburg, foreign juveniles made up 43.83% of all juvenile suspected offenders in 1997, approximately the same as in 1991 (41.27%); this was after a temporary peak in 1993 with 53.14%.

Figure 11. Juvenile crime rate in Prague (Czech and foreign juveniles). Source: Statistics of the Ministry for Justice, Czech Bureau of Statistics, Prague, as well as calculations of the authors.
In Prague, on the other hand, where foreign juveniles have made up 1.72% of the juvenile population since 1991, the crime rate among foreign juveniles has constantly increased, even if very slightly: from 2.29% in 1993, 2.35% in 1994, 2.81% in 1995 to 3.55% in 1996.

The juvenile crime rate among foreigners in Hamburg is put into perspective if it is compared with the high proportion of foreigners in the juvenile population. In 1997, the proportion of foreign juvenile offenders represented in the crime rate was 1.5 times as high as that of foreign juveniles in the juvenile population (43.83% as against 30.66%), whereas in Prague, although the absolute figure is very low, they made up 3.55% of the juvenile crime rate despite constituting only 1.72% of the juvenile population, that is, twice as high a percentage.

**Final Comments**

Let us take a final look at the results of this comparison of the criminal justice systems in four large European cities. The most salient feature is that the crime rates and processing structures in the former socialist

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<th></th>
<th>Hamburg</th>
<th>Prague</th>
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<tr>
<td>Proceedings initiated</td>
<td>6,282</td>
<td>6,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjudicated</td>
<td>2,006</td>
<td>1,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentenced</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentenced to imprisonment</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentenced to imprisonment without probation</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisoned (not including pre-trial detention)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For 1996 the number of alleged offenders is shown.

*Source: Police statistics Hamburg; Regional Bureau for Statistics Hamburg; statistics on prosecution and the penal system; police statistics, Ministry for the Interior, statistics of the Ministry for Justice, Prague.*
countries display considerable similarities. It would almost be possible to speak of a specific type of criminal justice system with a typical form of reaction. This can not only be seen in the similar criminality structures (see Figures 2, 4–6) in Prague, Cracow and Budapest, but also in the ‘filtering’ processes of these legal systems, which differ in many ways from the same process in the West (see Figure 7).

While in the West, the large number of suspects is considerably reduced during later stages of selection to a much smaller number (those actually sentenced and/or imprisoned) according to what we have called the ‘funnel’ model, in the East a smaller number of suspected offenders enters this selection process, but tends to remain within it and be sentenced – the ‘cylinder’ model. These procedural structures have changed little in the 1990s, and there has certainly not been any increasing alignment of the Eastern systems with the Western one. Indeed, the difference has, if anything, become greater (see Table III).

This is probably the result of different attitudes to crime control that, for the time being, will not be overcome even by amendments to the law: for example, the reservations held by Eastern criminal justice systems regarding alternative sanctions such as mediation and victim compensation by offenders. The fact that the pressure on the capacity of the justice systems in these countries is still considerably less than in the West could play a role in this regard. However, the need for economy has not yet become as important a factor as it perhaps is in the West. These lower crime statistics as compared with the West – represented here by Hamburg – are, however, not only the result of equally large discrepancies between the ‘real’ crime rates, but in this regard, the pro-active crime prevention measures of the police, which in Hamburg have caused the inclusion of an increased number of juveniles and foreigners into the crime statistics since 1995, have also had a great effect. Our project thus clearly demonstrates the importance of interpreting crime statistics neither as a true representation nor as a distorted reflection of the activities of a criminal justice system. Instead, these statistics should be seen as reflecting specific processing procedures and methods of crime control.
We should like to thank Dr. Szilvester Póczik, Budapest, for making some data from Budapest available to us.

REFERENCES


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SELECTED ARTICLES AND REPORTS

This section contains a selection of abstracts of recent reports and articles on the central topic of this issue. The aim of publishing these short summaries is to generate and disseminate additional information. Most of the articles have been published in other journals in the English language, although we aim to incorporate French or German literature on the subject. General information on criminal policy and research in Europe can be supplied by the WODC Documentation Service (infodesk@wodc.minjust.nl). Single copies of the articles can (when used for individual study or education) be provided by the WODC Documentation Service.


Across the minor communities that comprise the heart of our larger corporal communities, the problem of violent crime expresses itself in characteristically different ways. All violent crime is a by-product of the struggle for domination that occurs in one form or another among all types of people in every type of minor community. However, the predominant individual type that inhabits a minor community varies along with a minor community’s prevailing norm for settling dominance disputes and, in turn, the severity of its violent crime problem. In ‘malignant’ minor communities, the ultra-violent and violent people are the predominant individual types, the prevailing norm for settling disputes over dominance is the proverbial “tooth and claw”; and violent crime is rampant. In ‘civil’ minor communities, the minor communities predominant individual types are the marginally violent person and pacifist; the prevailing norm for settling dominance disputes involves a variety of non-violent tactics; and violent crimes are a rarity. In ‘turbulent’ minor communities, there is neither a predominant individual type nor a prevailing norm for resolving dominance disputes, so violent crime is a smaller problem than in malignant minor communities, but still a much bigger one than in civil minor communities.


The social disorganisation perspective assumes that social interaction among neighbours is a central element in the control of community crime. Moreover, social interaction among neighbours that occurs frequently, such as every day, is assumed to be the most effective. This analysis tests that assumption by exploring the consequences of frequent and infrequent interaction. The author constructs 10 alternative measures of social interaction and separately examines the effect of each on the rates of three serious crimes across 60 urban neighbourhoods. Findings suggest that the type of interaction matters. Getting together once a year or more with neighbours has the most consistent and generally strongest effect on burglary, motor vehicle theft, and robbery. Furthermore this form of interaction mediates a significant proportion of the effect of ecological characteristics on community crime. Implications for community crime research are discussed.

This Bulletin provides promising preventative approaches, summarises the risk factors challenging youth, features effective prevention programmes supported by OJJDP, and describes planning, training, and technical assistance opportunities available through OJJDP's Community Prevention Grants. Combining the knowledge available about effective prevention programmes and a community-based planning and implementation programme, maximises the opportunity for success.


Discussions about community safety and crime prevention have been criticised for neglecting the impact of white-collar, corporate or business crime, which is difficult to measure or subject to victim surveys. Drawing on a variety of sources, this article explores the potential impact of a range of such offences on individual householders and neighbourhoods, in major sites of crime identified in crime prevention literature. It concludes by discussing the implications of this for the discourse of community safety and crime policies.

Dignan, J., A. Sorsby and J. Hibbert, Neighbour Disputes: Comparing the Cost-Effectiveness of Mediation and Alternative Approaches. Sheffield, University of Sheffield, 1996.

Neighbour disputes are commonplace. The study presented in this article suggests that the number of neighbour nuisance complaints reported each year to local authority housing and environmental health service departments could be upwards of 250,000, about two thirds of which are likely to be noise-related. However, it is known that the great majority of neighbour nuisance complaints are not reported to any of the agencies concerned with the problem. And, with the exception of noise complaints, very little is known about the types of complaints involved, the way they are dealt with or their resource implications. One of the aims of the present study was to identify the range of costs incurred both by those embroiled in neighbour disputes and those with responsibility for handling them, and to seek to quantify these where possible. However, the main aim was to investigate the cost effectiveness of mediation compared with conventional methods of dealing with neighbour disputes. The report is based on the findings of two national surveys focusing on community mediation services and local authority health and environmental health departments, together with the findings of a series of much more detailed case studies involving both sets of agencies.


This article addresses the effects of an urban neighbourhood's response to a significant increase in crime, drugs, and other incivilities in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Residents organised a major effort to stabilise the neighbourhood that included implementation of a
defensible space plan. Comparisons of crime data and of residents' perceptions of crime between the pre- and post-implementation periods show significant improvements. The data provide greater support for the opportunity model of community crime prevention than for the community model. Caution is provided regarding a transplant of the same plan elsewhere.


A conceptual framework for studying emerging neighbourhood effects on individual development is presented, identifying specific mechanisms and processes by which neighbourhood disadvantage influences adolescent development outcomes. Using path analyses, the authors test the hypothesis that these organisational and cultural features of neighbourhoods mediate the effects of ecological disadvantage on adolescent development and behaviour; they then estimate the unique contribution of neighbourhood effects on development using hierarchical linear modelling.


This chapter reports the findings of a research project which investigated commercial crime on three streets in the London Borough of Camden. First, the rates of business victimisation and the impact of crime on businesses are discussed. Secondly, the efforts of crime prevention measures are considered. Finally, business involvement in community safety and the problems encountered when trying to increase it are discussed.


This article evaluates the role of family and neighbourhood empowerment in preventing crime, particularly among juveniles. Some scholars have taken the position that families and communities play a vital role in preparing children for the future. Existing research suggests that families are one of the strongest socialising agents that transmit social norms and mores to children. They teach children to distinguish acceptable behaviour from unacceptable behaviour, vanquish unacceptable behaviour, defer gratification, and respect the rights and property of others. The family is perceived to be encompassing both the physiological and socio-psychological aspects of a child's development. Antithetically, families can also teach children aggressive, antisocial, and violent behaviour. If this is true, then families and neighbourhood communities appear to be crucial, potentially productive, points of intervention at which to control and prevent delinquency. Providing parents with knowledge and skills about adequate child-rearing techniques, individual characteristics of the child and the neighbourhood helps them prepare their children for the future. This article presents the preliminary results of the evaluation of intervention through family and neighbourhood empowerment in controlling and preventing juvenile crime.

In this study ‘Strategic Crime Analysis and Urban Crime Patterns’, traditional research into urban crime patterns is reconsidered from a rational choice perspective. It is argued that the rational choice approach can be a promising alternative framework for research into urban crime patterns, primarily because of its two-phase explanation of macro-phenomena. In the first phase an explicit micro-theory about the behaviour of individuals which underlies certain criminal events is developed. In the second phase urban crime patterns are explained by showing how the behaviour of individuals is transformed into urban crime patterns, taking into account (varying) boundary conditions such as the urban structure and the spatial distribution of potential offenders and potential crime targets. The rational choice approach is then elaborated for residential burglary. A theoretical model has been developed, based upon former research into residential burglary. Furthermore, this model has been tested empirically, using data of all the residential burglaries committed in the city of Enschede from 1987 until 1992 (known to the police) and all the offenders involved (that is, those who have been apprehended for these burglaries).


In Germany, working relations between state criminal justice agencies and non-state institutions are often extremely close, relying upon networks of communication and a degree of mutual reliance which in Britain would undoubtedly invoke reference to the idea of ‘community’. In Germany, however, criminal justice professionals rarely describe this in terms of community. Though the emergence of locally based criminal justice initiatives has been later and less extensive in Germany than in Britain, there have been significant institutional developments in this direction over the last decade, particularly in the fields of crime prevention and victim-offender mediation. By reflecting on why it is that in Germany the vocabularies in which local or informal criminal justice initiatives have been framed rarely make reference to the idea of ‘community’, the authors hope to gain some insight into the conditions under which the appeal to community becomes powerful in societies such as Britain.


This article is concerned with how the adult residents of one medium-sized, moderately affluent English town which is generally regarded as having a relatively low crime rate, interpret and respond to teenage ‘incivilities’. The authors begin by locating the conflicts over teenage misbehaviour that occur across many of the town’s diverse areas and by assessing how the intensity of the adult response varies according to people’s relationship to place. They then examine the kinds of discourse that such misbehaviour prompts, discourse that frequently slips away from the locality as such and speaks to the condition (and decline) of the ‘national community’. Finally, they consider some of the responses
that people make to teenage misbehaviour in their own immediate neighbourhoods. By connecting people's 'crime-talk' to their sense of place, they tease out a contradiction between the obligations that people acknowledge to troublesome 'local' youth and their more punitive, exclusionary utterances about 'youth in general'.


Using data from a nationally representative sample of small cities and towns in the United States, this article examines how law enforcement officials, government representatives, educators, and community leaders in small cities and towns describe their communities, schools and youth problems. It presents leading citizens' assessments of youth problems in and out of school, as well as educator perceptions of problems in the public junior high and high schools in their communities, and anti-drug education and services in their schools.


After the fall of the communist regime at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, Poland started a new phase of social and economic development. Along with positive changes within the politics and economy of the country, there appeared a number of pathological phenomena leading to a considerable increase in crime—particularly that of a violent and brutal nature. Hence, the public shows more understanding of the need for cooperation with the police and for the involvement of local communities in public order protection.


This study is a theoretical exploration of the impact of public social control on the functioning of local social controls. Set within the framework of social disorganization and systemic theory, the study argues that an overreliance on incarceration as a formal control may hinder the ability of some communities to foster other forms of control because they weaken family and community structures. At the ecological level, the side effects of policies intended to fight crime by controlling individual behaviour may exacerbate the problems they are intended to address. Thus, these communities may experience more, not less, social disorganization.


'The neighbourhood a hotbed? The influence of environment on juvenile delinquency'. Neighbourhoods show great differences in crime rates. These also apply to the number of juvenile residents committing crimes; this number varies substantially between residential areas in a city. Criminologists have been searching for an explanation of these differences in the characteristic features of the environment. In this book some hypotheses about the influence of environment on juvenile delinquency are tested.

Recent theoretical and empirical developments within social disorganization theory rely heavily on a systemic model of community attachment. It has been argued that poverty, heterogeneity, and mobility undermine neighbourhood networks and social ties, contributing to a breakdown in informal social control that, in turn, allows for increasing crime rates. Tests of the systemic nature of informal social control within a community crime model have been rare, however, and the empirical results mixed. In addition some recent research raises the question as to whether social ties have consistent meaning in terms of social control across neighbourhoods. The authors test the role of local social ties both as a mediator between structural conditions and crime rates and as conditional upon neighbourhood characteristics using data on 100 Seattle census tracts. They found that local social ties decrease the assault rate significantly, but have little mediating effects between community structure and crime rates. The effect of social ties on burglary, however, is contrary to social disorganization hypotheses. More importantly, the authors found that local social ties have different effects in different types of neighbourhood.

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